管理评论

管理评论 ›› 2026, Vol. 38 ›› Issue (5): 225-237.

• 运营与供应链管理 • 上一篇    

舆情影响下考虑产品质量和商誉的供应链合作策略研究——基于区块链溯源视角

单子丹1,2, 朱蔓1, 王玡琦1, 郝帅1   

  1. 1. 哈尔滨理工大学经济与管理学院, 哈尔滨 150040;
    2. 哈尔滨理工大学高新技术产业发展研究中心, 哈尔滨 150040
  • 收稿日期:2024-07-17 发布日期:2026-06-06
  • 作者简介:单子丹,哈尔滨理工大学经济与管理学院教授,博士生导师,博士;朱蔓,哈尔滨理工大学经济与管理学院硕士研究生;王玡琦,哈尔滨理工大学经济与管理学院博士研究生;郝帅,哈尔滨理工大学经济与管理学院硕士研究生。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目（72474060）；国家社会科学基金项目（23BGL057）；黑龙江省哲学社会科学研究规划项目（24JLB001）；黑龙江省经济社会发展重点研究项目（JD25046）。

Research on Supply Chain Cooperation Strategy Considering Product Quality and Goodwill under the Influence of Public Opinion-Based on the Perspective of Blockchain Traceability

Shan Zidan1,2, Zhu Man1, Wang Yaqi1, Hao Shuai1   

  1. 1. School of Economics and Management, Harbin University of Science and Technology, Harbin 150040;
    2. High Tech Industry Development Research Center of Harbin University of Science and Technology, Harbin 150040
  • Received:2024-07-17 Published:2026-06-06

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摘要： 当有关产品的网络舆情存在负性偏向时,其传播不仅会引发单一企业信任危机,更在供应链体系中产生严重的纵向负面溢出效应,影响供应链的可持续发展。基于区块链溯源视角,揭示了信任修复与合作之间的相互作用机制,构建了SG(协同合作)、NC(分工合作)及QI(分工赞助合作)三种合作模型,探究了其适用条件,并给出了最优均衡策略。研究结果表明,舆情影响下SG合作策略最优,尽管QI合作策略能激励供应商提升质量改进努力,但供应链整体利润会下降;从动态角度来看,产品质量水平与商誉水平最终都趋于稳定,但商誉水平趋于稳定的时间更晚;供应链均衡策略对消费者溯源偏好较为敏感,但舆情影响越深,区块链溯源的正向影响效果越弱。供应链应依据舆情爆发的猛烈程度动态适配演化博弈策略,常态期建立紧密协作与资源共享机制,形成协同效应共同提升市场需求;危机期激励供应商进行质量改进,减少对商誉修复的过度依赖。警惕高冲击下的边际成本约束,通过优化资源配置实现供应链韧性提升与运营效率的动态均衡,本研究为数字经济时代供应链韧性治理理论提供了新的微观实证与范式支撑。

关键词: 网络舆情, 质量改进, 商誉修复, 合作策略, 区块链

Abstract: When a product receives increasingly negative online opinions from the public, its producer will suffer trust crisis, which will then spill over into the supply chain system, thus undermining the sustainable development of the supply chain. Based on the perspective of blockchain traceability, this paper reveals the interaction mechanism between trust repair and cooperation, constructs three cooperation models:SG (collaborative), NC (division of labor) and QI (division of labor and sponsorship), explores their applicable conditions, and gives the optimal equilibrium strategy. The research shows that the SG cooperation strategy is optimal under the influence of public opinion. Although the QI cooperation strategy can encourage suppliers to make more efforts in quality improvement, the overall profit of the supply chain will decline. From a dynamic point of view, the product quality level and the goodwill level eventually tend to be stable, but the goodwill level tends to be stable later. The supply chain equilibrium strategy is more sensitive to consumers' traceability preferences, but the deeper the influence of public opinion, the weaker the positive impact of blockchain traceability. Supply chains should dynamically adapt evolutionary game strategies based on public opinion intensity. During normal periods, they should establish close collaboration and resource-sharing mechanisms to create synergistic effects that jointly enhance market demand; during crisis periods, they should incentivize suppliers to improve quality and reduce excessive reliance on reputation repair. It is crucial to be vigilant about marginal cost constraints under high-impact scenarios, achieving a dynamic equilibrium between supply chain resilience enhancement and operational efficiency through optimized resource allocation. This study provides new micro-empirical evidence and paradigmatic support for supply chain resilience governance theories in the digital economy era.

Key words: online public opinion, quality improvement, repair of goodwill, cooperation strategy, blockchain