管理评论

管理评论 ›› 2026, Vol. 38 ›› Issue (2): 224-234.

• 运营与供应链管理 • 上一篇    

跨境电商平台赋能中国品牌制造商出海——基于需求信息共享的视角

侯棚文1, 张驰2, 王君3   

  1. 1. 南开大学商学院, 天津 300071;
    2. 山东大学管理学院, 济南 250100;
    3. 天津财经大学管理科学与工程学院, 天津 300222
  • 收稿日期:2024-04-07 发布日期:2026-03-13
  • 作者简介:侯棚文，南开大学商学院副教授，博士生导师，博士；张驰，山东大学管理学院硕士研究生；王君，天津财经大学管理科学与工程学院副教授，硕士生导师，博士。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金青年项目(72102163)；国家自然科学基金项目(72441004)；教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(22YJC630136)。

Cross-border E-commerce Platform Empowering Chinese Brand Manufacturers to Go Overseas: A Perspective Based on Demand Information Sharing Strategy

Hou Pengwen1, Zhang Chi2, Wang Jun3   

  1. 1. Business School, Nankai University, Tianjin 300071;
    2. School of Management, Shandong University, Jinan 250100;
    3. School of Management Science and Engineering, Tianjin University of Finance and Economics, Tianjin 300222
  • Received:2024-04-07 Published:2026-03-13

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摘要： 跨境电子商务的蓬勃发展为中国品牌制造商开拓跨境市场提供了崭新的机遇。然而，在与当地品牌制造商的竞争中，由于需求信息的劣势，中国品牌制造商可能陷入不利的境地，因此，亟须解决需求信息不对称的问题。由于跨境电商平台更加熟悉海外市场，如何与中国品牌制造商共享市场信息以实现最大化利润，成为平台面临的关键问题。为此，本文构建了一个由中国品牌制造商、当地品牌制造商、跨境电商平台和消费者组成的跨境供应链，探讨了跨境电商平台信息共享策略对跨境电商供应链定价决策的影响。研究发现：在信息不共享且市场波动性较小时，当地品牌制造商有动机发送相同的价格信号以实现混同均衡；当市场波动性较大时，则有动机利用不同的价格实现分离均衡，并在某些条件下需要付出信号成本。在混同均衡下，当地品牌制造商的相对品牌价值较小时，平台与中国品牌制造商共享信息更有利。研究发现，适时的信息共享策略不仅能够促进市场繁荣，提升中国品牌制造商和跨境电商平台的利润，还提高了当地品牌制造商的决策效率，最终实现供应链三方成员的帕累托最优。

关键词: 跨境电子商务, 中国品牌制造商, 信息共享, 信号博弈

Abstract: The flourishing cross-border e-commerce creates new opportunities for Chinese brand manufacturers to enter international markets. However, Chinese brands may face a disadvantage due to asymmetric demand information when competing with local brand manufacturers. Cross-border e-commerce platforms, with their deeper understanding of overseas markets, play a crucial role in sharing market information with the entrants. We develop a cross-border supply chain model involving a Chinese brand manufacturer, a local brand manufacturer, a cross-border e-commerce platform, and consumers, and investigate the impact of information sharing strategy on pricing decisions. Our findings indicate that without information sharing, local brand manufacturer, when facing relatively low market volatility, tends to send the uniform price signal to achieve the pooling equilibrium. In scenarios with higher market volatility, the local brand manufacturer may adopt different prices to achieve a separating equilibrium, incurring signaling costs under certain conditions. In the pooling equilibrium, when the relative brand value of local products is low, the platform is more likely to share information. Our study reveals that the timely information sharing strategy can stimulate the growth of the consumer market, and ultimately achieve Pareto improvement for all three supply chain members.

Key words: cross-border e-commerce, Chinese brand manufacturer, information sharing, signaling game