预防性监管与企业杠杆操纵——基于证监会随机抽查的准自然实验

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 证监会随机抽查是重要的预防性监管手段，其实施效果备受关注。本文以2013—2022年A股高杠杆公司为样本，基于企业杠杆操纵视角检验证监会随机抽查的经济后果。研究发现，证监会随机抽查能够有效抑制上市公司杠杆操纵行为。机制检验结果表明，随机抽查通过提高企业信息透明度、优化内部治理，发挥良好的信息效应和治理效应，进而约束企业的杠杆操纵行为。进一步研究发现，随机抽查对企业杠杆操纵的抑制作用在信息环境质量更差、外部监督更弱以及杠杆操纵动机更强的企业中更为明显。本文拓展了证监会随机抽查制度的经济后果研究，也为防范企业杠杆操纵和化解系统性金融风险提供有益启示。

关键词: 预防性监管, 随机抽查, 杠杆操纵, 高杠杆公司

Abstract: Random inspection by the China Securities Regulatory Commission(CSRC) is an important means of preventive supervision, and its effectiveness has received much attention. Using a sample of highly leveraged A-share listed companies between 2013 and 2022, this paper examines the impact of random inspection by CSRC from the perspective of corporate leverage manipulation. The results show that random inspection can effectively restrain the leverage manipulation of listed companies. The mechanism tests show that random inspection has an effective information effect and governance effect, by enhancing information transparency and optimizing internal governance, which restrains the leverage manipulation behavior of listed companies. Further study shows that the inhibitory effect of random inspection on corporate leverage manipulation is more pronounced in firms exposed to a low-quality information environment, under weak external supervision, and highly motivated to manipulate leverage. This paper extends the study on the economic consequences of random inspection, and also provides useful insights for preventing leverage manipulation and mitigating systemic financial risks.

Key words: preventive supervision, random inspection, leverage manipulation, highly leveraged companies

牛煜皓, 程琳, 文雯. 预防性监管与企业杠杆操纵——基于证监会随机抽查的准自然实验[J]. 管理评论, 2026, 38(1): 167-180.

Niu Yuhao, Cheng Lin, Wen Wen. Preventive Supervision and Corporate Leverage Manipulation—A Quasi-natural Experiment Based on Random Inspections by CSRC[J]. Management Review, 2026, 38(1): 167-180.

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