管理评论

管理评论 ›› 2025, Vol. 37 ›› Issue (9): 124-136.

• 创新与创业管理 • 上一篇    

选择赢家还是打造赢家？政府R&D补贴政策与企业技术创新作用机制研究

陈朝月1, 许治2, 卢涛3   

  1. 1. 华南师范大学经济与管理学院, 广州 510006;
    2. 华南理工大学工商管理学院, 广州 510641;
    3. 中国科学院大学经济与管理学院, 北京 100190
  • 收稿日期:2022-05-09 发布日期:2025-10-13
  • 作者简介:陈朝月，华南师范大学经济与管理学院讲师，博士；许治（通讯作者），华南理工大学工商管理学院教授，博士；卢涛，中国科学院大学经济与管理学院副教授，博士。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目（72104081；72034002；71974179；72192843；72264006）；广东省哲学社会科学规划青年项目（GD24YGL18）；广东省自然科学基金面上项目（2021A1515011878）；中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目（UCAS-E1E40804X2）。

Picking Winners or Building Winners? Research on the Mechanism of Government R&D Subsidy Policy and Enterprise Technological Innovation

Chen Chaoyue1, Xu Zhi2, Lu Tao3   

  1. 1. School of Management and Economics, South China Normal University, Guangzhou 510006;
    2. School of Business Administration, South China University of Technology, Guangzhou 510641;
    3. School of Management and Economics, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190
  • Received:2022-05-09 Published:2025-10-13

PDF (PC)

20

摘要： 政府如何制定合理遴选补贴对象标准以实现企业创新增长，对补贴政策的制定和评价具有重要意义。本文在采用大规模创新调查数据集并考虑内生性问题基础上，从“选择赢家”和“打造赢家”两个方面探讨了政府补贴对企业创新的影响机制。结果表明：政府补贴倾向于选择高组织学习能力的企业，经验学习、认知学习和组织间学习是其重要的遴选标准，其选择路径为高组织学习能力的企业偏向于外部技术获取模式，能够更为稳定快速地实现补贴目标。在控制选择偏差的基础上，政府补贴具有显著的“打造赢家”效应，其中普惠型补贴引致效应最高，自由裁量型补贴次之，选择型补贴最低。进一步对企业分组发现，在国有企业、大型企业和非初创企业中，经验学习并非政府补贴的遴选标准，并且政府补贴的“打造赢家”效应在上述企业中更为显著。

关键词: 政府补贴, 选择赢家, 打造赢家, 创新绩效

Abstract: It is of great significance for the formulation and implementation of subsidy policies to explore how the government can reasonably pick subsidy targets to achieve innovative growth of enterprises. Based on the large-scale innovation survey data set and considering endogeneity, this paper explores the mechanism of how government subsidies influence enterprise innovation from two aspects: “picking winners” and “building winners”. The empirical study finds that government subsidies have a “picking winner” strategy to select enterprises with high organizational learning ability. Empirical learning, cognitive learning and inter-organizational learning are the important selection criteria for government subsidies. The internal mechanism of “picking winners” is that enterprises with high organizational learning ability tend to adopt external technology acquisition mode to obtain stable innovation output in the short term, and it is easier to achieve the goal of government subsidies. On the basis of controlling selection bias, government subsidies have a significant “building winners” effect, which is the most, the less and the least pronouced respectively for universal subsidies, discretionary subsidies and selective subsidies. Further analysis by type of enterprises finds that empirical learning is not a selection criterion for the government to grant subsidies to state-owned enterprises, large enterprises and non-start-up enterprises, for which the “building winner” effect of government subsidies is more significant.

Key words: government R&D subsidy policy, picking winners, building winners, innovation performance