合作能否提高充电运营商的运维能力？基于平台经济视角的研究

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 新能源汽车充电桩作为新基建的重点发展领域之一，其运营商的运维能力是影响我国充电市场健康发展的重要因素。充电平台的建立为充电桩运营商与充电用户之间的供需匹配提供了场所，但由于平台中充电运营商的运维能力参差不齐，低运维能力的运营商易通过搭便车方式损害高运维能力运营商的经济利益，进而导致充电平台中的“公地悲剧”。因此，本文基于平台经济视角，关注充电平台中具有异质性运维能力充电运营商的交互关系，基于博弈理论与公共物品理论构建公共品博弈模型，分析不同充电运营商在提高运维能力问题上的决策行为并识别关键影响因素。研究发现，充电运营商的自发合作并不能抵御搭便车策略的入侵；种群密度的增加和学习范围的扩大将促进充电运营商由选择合作策略转向选择搭便车策略；迁移范围的扩大将促进选择合作策略的充电运营商形成稳定的空间集群。本研究对于提升充电运营商的运维能力、推动充电平台及充电市场的规范化发展，以及助力新型基础设施建设目标的实现，具有重要的参考价值。

关键词: 公共充电桩, 新型基础设施, 运维决策, 公共品博弈, 平台经济

Abstract: As one of the key development areas in new infrastructure, the operational capabilities of operators are a significant factor affecting the healthy development of China's charging market for new energy vehicles. The establishment of charging platforms provides a space for matching the supply and demand between charging pile operators and users. However, due to the uneven operational and maintenance capabilities of charging operators within the platform, operators with low capabilities tend to free-ride, damaging the economic interests of operators with high capabilities. This can lead to the tragedy of the commons within the charging platform. Therefore, this study adopts a platform economy perspective to examine the interactions among charging operators with heterogeneous operational and maintenance capabilities within charging platforms. Utilizing game theory and public goods theory, a public goods game model is constructed to analyze the decision-making behaviors of different charging operators regarding the enhancement of their operational capabilities and to identify key influencing factors. The research reveals that spontaneous cooperation among charging operators is insufficient to resist the invasion of operators employing the hitchhiking strategy. Increasing population density and learning range promote a gradual shift from cooperation to hitchhiking strategy among operators, while an expanded migratory range fosters the formation of stable spatial clusters by operators choosing the cooperation strategy. This research offers important insights for improving the operational capabilities of charging operators within charging platforms, fostering the healthy development of charging platforms and markets, and realizing the construction objectives of new infrastructure projects.

Key words: public chargers, new infrastructure, operational decision-making, public goods game, platform economy

高鑫, 贾富源, 宋瑞震, 南浩楠, 曾若辰. 合作能否提高充电运营商的运维能力？基于平台经济视角的研究[J]. 管理评论, 2025, 37(5): 233-242.

Gao Xin, Jia Fuyuan, Song Ruizhen, Nan Haonan, Zeng Ruochen. Can Cooperation Enhance the Operational Capabilities of Charging Operators? A Study from the Perspective of the Platform Economy[J]. Management Review, 2025, 37(5): 233-242.

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