管理评论 ›› 2025, Vol. 37 ›› Issue (5): 221-232.

• 会计与财务管理 • 上一篇    

控股股东共同所有权与公司战略

董怀丽1, 罗进辉2, 向元高3   

  1. 1. 南京理工大学经济管理学院, 南京 210094;
    2. 厦门大学管理学院, 厦门 361005;
    3. 同济大学经济与管理学院, 上海 200092
  • 收稿日期:2023-03-06 发布日期:2025-06-18
  • 作者简介:董怀丽,南京理工大学经济管理学院讲师,博士;罗进辉(通讯作者),厦门大学管理学院教授,博士生导师,博士;向元高,同济大学经济与管理学院博士后、助理研究员,博士。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金青年项目(72302171);中国博士后科学基金面上项目(2023M732634)

Controlling Shareholders' Common Ownership and Corporate Strategy

Dong Huaili1, Luo Jinhui2, Xiang Yuangao3   

  1. 1. School of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Science and Technology, Nanjing 210094;
    2. School of Management, Xiamen University, Xiamen 361005;
    3. School of Economics and Management, Tongji University, Shanghai 200092
  • Received:2023-03-06 Published:2025-06-18

摘要: 近年来,国内外资本市场越来越普遍的共同所有权现象引起了学者们的广泛关注。然而,现有文献专注于机构投资者的共同所有权问题,而控股股东的共同所有权及其影响则鲜有研究涉及。鉴于此,本文聚焦于控股股东,利用中国沪深A股非国有上市公司的年度观察数据,实证检验了控股股东共同所有权对公司战略的潜在重要影响及其作用机制。结果发现:①控股股东共同所有权显著提高了公司的战略激进度。②控股股东共同所有权对公司战略激进度的正向影响在机构投资者持股比例较低、地区市场化环境较差时表现得更明显。机制检验发现,相比同行业的共同所有权,控股股东持有不同行业公司的共同所有权时才能提升公司的战略激进度;相比持股比例较高的控股股东,持股比例较低的控股股东的共同所有权对公司战略激进度的提升作用更强,这些结果支持了风险分散机制。同时,控股股东共同所有权还通过缓解公司融资约束增加了公司战略激进度,即支持了融资机制。进一步的渠道分析结果显示,提高公司的创新倾向和市场扩张倾向是控股股东共同所有权提高公司战略激进程度的两个具体路径。

关键词: 共同所有权, 控股股东, 战略激进度, 风险分散, 融资约束

Abstract: In the past two decades, common ownership has increased tremendously in domestic and foreign capital markets and received intense attention from the academic. Prior research mainly focuses on common ownership of institutional investors, but hardly examines the impact of controlling shareholders' common ownership. Based on this, this paper uses the sample data of annual observations of nonstate-owned A-share listed companies to empirically test the related economic impact of controlling shareholders' common ownership on corporate strategy and the underlying mechanism. The results show that:(1) controlling shareholders' common ownership significantly increases corporate strategic radicalization; (2) the positive impact of controlling shareholders' common ownership on corporate strategic radicalization is more pronounced for firms with low institutional ownership and regions with low degree of marketization. The mechanism test show that controlling shareholders increase corporate strategic radicalization only when they hold common ownership of firms in different industries and lower ownership of controlling firms, which supports the risk dispersion mechanism. Consistent with the expectation of the financing constraint mechanism, controlling shareholders' common ownership significantly reduces the degree of financing constraint. In addition, controlling shareholders' common ownership increases corporate innovation and market expansion tendency, thereby enhancing corporate strategic radicalization.

Key words: common ownership, controlling shareholders, strategic radicalization, risk dispersion, financing constraint