管理评论

管理评论 ›› 2025, Vol. 37 ›› Issue (2): 3-18.

• 经济与金融管理 •    

限制高管机会主义减持能够提升股价信息含量吗？——来自“减持新规”的经验证据

黄婉1, 罗宏2   

  1. 1. 四川大学商学院, 成都 610064;
    2. 西南财经大学会计学院, 成都 611130
  • 收稿日期:2022-09-03 发布日期:2025-03-06
  • 作者简介:黄婉，四川大学商学院助理研究员，博士；罗宏（通讯作者），西南财经大学会计学院教授，博士生导师，博士。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金青年项目（72302167）；教育部人文社会科学研究项目（22XJA790006）；中国博士后科学基金面上项目（2022M722240）；中央高校基本科研业务费项目（skbsh2023-56）。

Can Executive Opportunistic Stock Selling Restrictions Improve Stock Price Informativeness? Evidence from the “New Regulation on Insider Selling” in China

Huang Wan1, Luo Hong2   

  1. 1. Business School, Sichuan University, Chengdu 610064;
    2. School of Accounting, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu 611130
  • Received:2022-09-03 Published:2025-03-06

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摘要： 有效规范高管减持行为对于促进资本市场长期稳定健康发展具有重要意义。本文基于“减持新规”实施这一准自然实验，利用2012—2021年中国A股上市公司数据，考察限制高管机会主义减持对公司股价信息含量的影响。研究发现，限制高管机会主义减持有助于提升公司股票价格中的信息含量，这一作用效果在高管减持规模更大、存在核心高管减持时更显著；并且当公司信息环境较差、信息披露操纵倾向较大时，限制高管机会主义减持对股价信息含量的提升作用也更明显。进一步研究发现，限制高管机会主义减持增强了外部投资者搜集公司层面信息的动机，表现为更多机构投资者持股以及更多投资者关注，也改善了公司当前股票价格反映未来盈余的信息含量。

关键词: 减持新规, 机会主义减持, 股价信息含量, 内部人交易

Abstract: It is of great significance to effectively regulate executives’ selling behaviors to promote the long-term, stable and healthy development of capital market. Based on the “New Regulation on Insider Selling” in China and using data from A-share listed companies from 2012 to 2021, this paper investigates the impact of restricting executives’ opportunistic stock selling on stock price informativeness. The results show that restricting executives’ opportunistic stock selling can help improve stock price informativeness. This effect is more significant when the selling scale is large and when there are stock sales by core executives. Moreover, this promotion effect is also strengthened for firms that are exposed to a poor information environment and prone to manipulate information disclosure. Further analysis suggests that restricting executives’ opportunistic stock selling can promote firm-level information collection by external investors, as evidenced by wider institutional shareholdings and more attention from investors. In addition, restricting executives’ opportunistic stock selling makes a firm’s current stock price more reflective of its future earnings. The main conclusion still holds after a series of robustness tests. Overall, this paper enriches the literature on both insider trading supervision and stock price informativeness, and has enlightenment for regulatory authorities to improve the design of stock selling system and promote the high-quality development of capital market.

Key words: new regulation on insider selling, opportunistic stock selling, stock price informativeness, insider trading