管理评论 ›› 2024, Vol. 36 ›› Issue (5): 151-163.

• 组织行为与人力资源管理 • 上一篇    

团队绩效报酬的“连坐治庸”效应探讨

马君1, 王靖文2   

  1. 1. 上海大学管理学院, 上海 200444;
    2. 上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院, 上海 200030
  • 收稿日期:2022-04-25 发布日期:2024-06-06
  • 通讯作者: 王靖文(通讯作者),上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院博士研究生。
  • 作者简介:马君,上海大学管理学院教授,博士生导师,博士。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目(71872111);教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(16YJA630036)。

Effective Exploration on the “Tandem Punishment for Poor Performers” of Team Pay-for-Performance

Ma Jun1, Wang Jingwen2   

  1. 1. School of Management, Shanghai University, Shanghai 200444;
    2. Antai College of Economics and Management, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200030
  • Received:2022-04-25 Published:2024-06-06

摘要: 推进团队协同创新的关键在于解决团队激励问题。传统团队激励通过利益捆绑机制旨在促进团队合作,然而团队中的绩差者不仅拖累团队绩效,还会影响其他团队成员的报酬。因此,打破“绩效连坐”的负面效应,挖掘团队激励中的自我纠偏机制便显得尤为重要。综合归因理论的三个要点(控制点、可控性、稳定性)、内疚感产生的三个条件(拖累他人、内归因、可控)、绩效改进的三个前提(期望值、工具性、效价)以及鞭策策略的三个表现(情感、认知、行为),本研究构建了一个三项交互的两阶段被调节的中介模型,旨在揭示“连坐治庸”的良性机制。运用区间估计Bootstrap法和J-N法对24家企业116个团队的调查数据进行假设检验。结果表明:(1)在实施团队绩效报酬的条件下,若员工的绩差表现由内部可控的因素导致,则会激发其内疚感,产生绩效改进动机;(2)同事在归因的基础上采取鞭策策略的对待方式,将加强处于内疚感的绩差者产生更强的绩效改进动机。本研究从自我驱动的视角为中国传统军事智慧“绩效连坐”制度提供了新的见解,同时也为现代组织如何打破“团队激励困境”提供了理论和实践启示。

关键词: 绩差员工, 团队绩效报酬, 内疚感, 鞭策策略, 绩效改进动机

Abstract: The key to advancing collaborative innovation within a team lies in addressing the issue of team motivation. Traditional team incentives, achieved through mechanisms of shared benefits, are designed to foster teamwork. However, poor performers within the team not only hinder the team's progress but also impact the rewards of other team members. To mitigate the negative effect of “tandem pun-ishment for performance”, it becomes particularly crucial to explore the self-correction mechanisms in team incentives. This paper com-prehensively applies the three points of attribution theory (locus of control, controllability and stability), the three conditions of guilt production (drag down others, internal attribution and high controllability), three premises of performance improvement (expectancy, instrumentality and valence) and three aspects of motivational strategy (emotion, cognition and behavior) to construct a two-stage media-tion model with three interactions, aiming to reveal the benign mechanism of “tandem punishment against mediocrity”. Under this back-ground, the interval estimation Bootstrap method and Johnson-Neyman method are used to conduct a hypothesis testing based on 116 teams in 24 enterprises. The results show that if an employee performs poorly due to internal controllable factors under the conditions of performance pay, he or she will feel guilty and become motivated to perform well. Furthermore, if spurred by colleagues on the basis of the attribution, the poor performer who feels guilty will have a stronger motivation to perform well. This study offers fresh insights into the traditional Chinese military wisdom of the “tandem punishment for performance” system from a self-driven perspective. Simultaneously, it also offers theoretical and practical implications for contemporary organizations on how to break the “team incentive dilemma”.

Key words: poor performer, team pay-for-performance, guilt, spur, performance improvement motivation