管理评论

管理评论 ›› 2024, Vol. 36 ›› Issue (4): 247-260.

• 物流与供应链管理 • 上一篇    

物流低碳协作配送的政府补贴激励机制研究

段忠菲1, 饶卫振1, 朱庆华2   

  1. 1. 山东科技大学经济管理学院, 青岛 266590;
    2.上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院, 上海 200030
  • 收稿日期:2022-03-31 发布日期:2024-05-21
  • 作者简介:段忠菲，山东科技大学经济管理学院博士研究生; 饶卫振(通讯作者)，山东科技大学经济管理学院教授，博士生导师，博士;朱庆华，上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院教授，博士生导师，博士。
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金重点项目（22AGL021）

A Research on Incentive Mechanism of Government Subsidy under Low-carbon Cooperative Distribution

Duan Zhongfei1, Rao Weizhen1, Zhu Qinghua2   

  1. 1. College of Economics and Management, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao 266590;
    2. Antai College of Economics & Management, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200030
  • Received:2022-03-31 Published:2024-05-21

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摘要： 低碳协作配送是一个可持续配送模式，政府补贴激励有利于促进物流低碳配送，如何设计合理的补贴激励机制是一个亟待解决的问题。当前协作企业偏好成本最小化规划协作配送路线，政府设置一定的补贴激励可以促进协作企业以碳排放量最小化为目标函数，实现物流低碳协作配送。文章首先同时建立成本最小化协作配送模型、碳排放量最小化协作配送模型与成本约束下的碳排放量最小化混合模型，并采用三阶段启发式算法对模型进行求解。其次，以求解结果作为依据设计政府补贴激励程度，计算政府对协作企业的总补贴金额。最后，基于合作博弈理论，将补贴金额合理分配至每个协作企业，从而提高企业对协作配送低碳运作的积极性。通过算例实验，发现政府补贴激励机制对物流低碳协作配送有正向促进作用，为政府设定激励机制提供一个新的思路。

关键词: 低碳物流, 协作配送, 政府补贴

Abstract: Low-carbon cooperative distribution is a sustainable distribution mode and government subsidy incentive is conducive to low-carbon logistics distribution. It is very necessary to design an appropriate subsidy-based incentive mechanism. Currently, cooperative enterprises prefer to select the low-cost transportation rather than the low-carbon transportation. Government can motivate cooperative enterprises to select the low-carbon mode by setting certain subsidy incentives in order to minimize carbon emissions and achieve low-carbon cooperative distribution. This research first proposes a cost-minimized cooperative distribution model, a carbon-emission-minimized cooperative distribution model and a carbon-emission-minimized hybrid model under cost constraint, and then develops a three-stage heuristic algorithm to solve the models. Based on the above solutions, this research designs the degree of government subsidy incentive and calculates the total amount of government subsidy to cooperative enterprises. Drawing on the cooperative game theory, we suggest allocating the subsidy to each cooperative enterprise, so as to improve their enthusiasm for the low-carbon operation of cooperative distribution. Experiment results indicate that the government subsidy has a positive impact on low-carbon cooperative distribution, and provide a new idea for the government to set the incentive mechanism.

Key words: low-carbon logistics, cooperative distribution, government subsidy