连锁股东与企业创新投入:促进还是抑制

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 企业创新活动嵌于连锁股东网络中,受连锁股东资源治理优势与合谋动机的双重影响。本文基于2007-2019年A股上市公司数据探究连锁股东与企业创新投入的关系,研究发现:连锁股东有利于提升企业创新投入,连锁股东数量越多,企业创新投入越多;机制研究表明,连锁股东的资源治理优势显著提升了企业的风险承担水平,进而增加了创新投入;此外,短期薪酬激励是连锁股东提升企业创新投入的现实途径,而长期薪酬激励的作用不显著;进一步研究发现,连锁股东提升企业创新投入的同时显著增加了创新产出,但未能显著提升企业的创新效率。本文构建了连锁股东影响企业创新投入的完整逻辑链条,为理解企业创新投入决策提供了连锁股东网络联结的解释,对企业实现自主创新、提升自身价值、推动高质量发展具有参考意义。

关键词: 连锁股东, 创新投入, 资源治理优势, 合谋动机, 企业风险承担, 薪酬激励

Abstract: Enterprise innovation activity is embedded in the network of cross-ownership, which is influenced by cross-ownership's advantages of governance and resources, and collusion. Based on the data of A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2019, this paper explores the relationship between cross-ownership and innovation input, and finds that cross-ownership is beneficial to enhancing enterprise innovation input, and the larger number of cross-owners, the more innovation input. The mechanism study shows that the resource governance advantage of cross-ownership significantly improves the level of enterprises risk-taking, which in turn increases the innovation input. The path study finds that the short-term compensation incentive is the main way for cross-ownership to influence the innovation input of enterprises. Furthermore, it is found that cross-ownership increases the innovation input and the innovation output, but not the innovation efficiency. This paper constructs a complete logic of the influence of cross-ownership on innovation input, which provides an explanation of cross-ownership' network connection for understanding enterprise innovation investment decision making. It sheds a light on how enterprises should explore and realize independent innovation in order to enhance their own value and promote high-quality development.

Key words: cross-ownership, innovation input, advantages of resources and governance, collusion motivation, enterprise risk-taking, compensation incentive

晓芳, 马一先. 连锁股东与企业创新投入:促进还是抑制[J]. 管理评论, 2023, 35(7): 138-150.

Xiao Fang, Ma Yixian. Cross-ownership and Enterprise Innovation Input: Promotion or Inhibition[J]. Management Review, 2023, 35(7): 138-150.

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