管理评论

管理评论 ›› 2023, Vol. 35 ›› Issue (12): 160-168.

• 市场营销 • 上一篇    下一篇

考虑双边用户多归属与组内网络效应的第三方制造平台服务与定价策略

但斌1,2, 熊俊1,2, 眭蓉华3, 张旭梅1,2   

  1. 1. 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院, 重庆 400044;
    2. 重庆大学现代物流重庆市重点实验室, 重庆 400030;
    3. 重庆工商大学工商管理学院, 重庆 400067
  • 收稿日期:2022-05-09 出版日期:2023-12-28 发布日期:2024-01-30
  • 通讯作者: 但斌(通讯作者)，重庆大学经济与工商管理学院教授，博士生导师，博士。
  • 作者简介:熊俊，重庆大学经济与工商管理学院硕士研究生；眭蓉华，重庆工商大学工商管理学院讲师，博士；张旭梅，重庆大学经济与工商管理学院教授，博士生导师，博士。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目(72072016)；中央高校基本科研业务费项目(2023CDJKYJH004)。

Service and Pricing Strategy of Third-party Manufacturing Platform Considering Intra-group Network Effects and Multihoming Behavior of Bilateral Users

Dan Bin1,2, Xiong Jun1,2, Sui Ronghua3, Zhang Xumei1,2   

  1. 1. School of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044;
    2. Chongqing Key Laboratory of Logistics at Chongqing University, Chongqing 400030;
    3. School of Business Administration, Chongqing Technology and Business University, Chongqing 400067
  • Received:2022-05-09 Online:2023-12-28 Published:2024-01-30

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摘要： 针对两个为制造商和供应商提供零部件交易服务的第三方制造平台，考虑双边用户之间存在正向的交叉网络效应且各边用户群体内部存在负向的组内网络效应，通过构建Hotelling模型，研究了制造商和供应商多归属时平台最优的服务与定价策略，并考察了组内网络效应对平台最优决策的影响。研究表明：当两个平台为用户带来的基础效用较高时，它们应采取差异化服务策略，在此情形下，平台总是向供应商收费更多，但可能给予制造商一定的补贴；而当两平台为用户带来的基础效用较低时，它们应该采取同质化服务策略，此时平台不再实施补贴策略，甚至在一定条件下，平台可能会对交叉网络效应强度更高的制造商收费更多。

关键词: 第三方制造平台, 组内网络效应, 多归属, 服务, 定价策略

Abstract: Aiming at two competitive third-party manufacturing platforms that offer parts trading service to manufacturers and suppliers, this paper considers the positive cross-network effects between bilateral users and the negative intra-group network effects within each user group. A Hotelling model is constructed to study the optimal service and pricing strategy of the platforms when manufacturers and suppliers are multihoming. The impacts of intra-group network effects on the optimal decision of platforms are further analyzed. The results show that, when the basic utility that platforms offer to users is high, the two platforms should adopt differentiated service strategy. In this case, platforms always charge more for suppliers, while it's possible to give some subsidies to manufactures. However, when the basic utility that platforms offer to users is low, the two platforms should implement homogeneous service strategy. At this time, platforms no longer give subsidies to manufacturers, and under certain conditions, the platforms will charge more for manufacturers even though manufactures' cross-network effect intensity is greater than suppliers'.

Key words: third-party manufacturing platform, intra-group network effects, multihoming, service, pricing strategy