管理评论

管理评论 ›› 2023, Vol. 35 ›› Issue (12): 169-181.

• 市场营销 • 上一篇    下一篇

非对称信息下制造商策略选择:渠道入侵与信息泄露

李秋香1,2, 吉慧敏2, 黄毅敏3, 齐二石4   

  1. 1. 河南大学管理科学与工程研究所, 开封 475004;
    2. 河南大学商学院, 开封 475004;
    3. 华北水利水电大学管理与经济学院, 郑州 450046;
    4. 天津大学管理与经济学部, 天津 300072
  • 收稿日期:2021-11-08 出版日期:2023-12-28 发布日期:2024-01-30
  • 作者简介:李秋香，河南大学管理科学与工程研究所、河南大学商学院副教授，硕士生导师，博士；吉慧敏，河南大学商学院硕士研究生；黄毅敏，华北水利水电大学管理与经济学院副教授，硕士生导师，博士；齐二石，天津大学管理与经济学部教授，博士生导师，博士。
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金项目（22BJY225；22FGLB058）。

Strategy Selection of Manufacturer Supply Chain Member under Asymmetric Information: Channel Encroachment and Information Leakage

Li Qiuxiang1,2, Ji Huimin2, Huang Yimin3, Qi Ershi4   

  1. 1. Institute of Management Science and Engineering, Henan University, Kaifeng 475004;
    2. Business School of Henan University, Kaifeng 475004;
    3. School of Economics and Management, North China University of Water Resources and Electric Power, Zhengzhou 450046;
    4. Department of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072
  • Received:2021-11-08 Online:2023-12-28 Published:2024-01-30

PDF (PC)

89

摘要： 考虑由制造商、大小型零售商和消费者组成的三级供应链，制造商通过大型零售商订单推断出市场需求状态并决策是否进行渠道入侵及信息泄露，由此构建制造商与零售商的四种博弈模型，研究制造商最优策略选择及对供应链成员利润的影响。研究发现，制造商是否直销渠道入侵与销售成本大小和产品市场需求状态有关，制造商是否泄露信息与其是否直销渠道入侵和高市场先验概率有关；大型零售商订单量均值会影响制造商信息泄露决策；制造商信息泄露对小型零售商并不总是有利的。

关键词: 信息泄露, 渠道入侵, 制造商策略

Abstract: The study considers a three-level supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, a large and a small retailer, and a customer, where the manufacturer infers the market demand state from the large retailer's orders and decides whether to invade channel and leak information, and constructs four game models between the manufacturer and the retailer to investigate the manufacturer's optimal strategy choice and the impact on the profit of the supply chain members. It is found that whether a manufacturer invades or not is related to the size of sales cost and the state of product market demand; whether a manufacturer leaks information is related to whether it invades through direct sales channels and the high prior market probability; the average value of large retailer orders affects the manufacturer's decision to leak information; and a manufacturer's information leak is not always beneficial to the small retailer.

Key words: information leakage, channel encroachment, the manufacturer's strategy