管理评论

管理评论 ›› 2022, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (7): 289-301.

• 会计与财务管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

管理者行为惯性与上市公司舞弊——基于高管公司间变更的视角

王俊1, 郭旭2   

  1. 1. 东北大学工商管理学院, 沈阳 110819;
    2. 中央财经大学会计学院, 北京 100081
  • 收稿日期:2021-02-08 出版日期:2022-07-28 发布日期:2022-08-19
  • 通讯作者: 王俊（通讯作者），东北大学工商管理学院讲师，博士。
  • 作者简介:郭旭，中央财经大学会计学院硕士研究生。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金青年项目（71902022）；中央高校基本科研业务费项目（N180603007）。

Management's Behavioral Inertia and Corporate Fraud: Evidence from Executives' Job-hopping in China

Wang Jun1, Guo Xu2   

  1. 1. School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110819;
    2. School of Accountancy, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing 100081
  • Received:2021-02-08 Online:2022-07-28 Published:2022-08-19

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摘要： 高管作为上市公司的行为主体，对公司舞弊具有不可推卸的责任。本文基于高阶管理理论和行为一致性理论，探究高管在公司间变更时，由管理者个人特质所导致的行为惯性是否会导致前任公司的舞弊经历对后任公司的会计信息质量产生影响。通过对2000—2017年间的高管离职去向进行追踪，本文发现，同一位变更高管前后任职公司的舞弊行为存在显著的正相关关系，较长的任职间隔期和良好的公司治理水平能够有效抑制管理者行为惯性对公司舞弊的影响；进一步测试表明，上述结果主要存在于前任公司的舞弊在高管任职前未被揭露时。本文的结论为监管机构和投资者理解上市公司会计信息质量的内在影响机制提供了新的视角，为上市公司聘任高管决策提供了经验证据。

关键词: 高管变更, 行为惯性, 公司舞弊, 经理人市场

Abstract: As the behavioral agent of a listed company, senior management has an inescapable responsibility for corporate fraud. Based on the Upper Echelons Theory and the Behavioral Consistency Theory, this paper explores whether the behavioral inertia of a senior executive who used to work in a company that committed fraud would bring adverse effect to the accounting information quality of the company that he or she newly joins. Based on a tracking survey of job-hopping executives' whereabouts from 2000 to 2017 in China, we find that in terms of fraud occurrence, there is a significant positive correlation between the two companies that an executive works formally and now in. A long interval between an executive leaving the former company and his or her joining the current company and better corporate governance can effectively restrain the influence of management's behavioral inertia on corporate fraud. Further tests show that the above results are applicable mainly to the situation where the former company's fraud is not detected before the executive takes office in the current company. Our conclusion provides a new perspective for regulators and investors to understand the mechanism of how Chinese listed companies' accounting information quality is affected, and also provides empirical evidence that listed companies can use for reference in selecting executive candidates.

Key words: executives' job-hopping, behavioral inertia, corporate fraud, executive labor market