家族决策权配置与企业创新——基于冗余资源与社会情感财富的调节效应

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文以2011-2016年中国家族上市企业为样本，研究了四类家族决策权配置模式与企业创新的关系，并探讨了冗余资源与社会情感财富的调节效应。研究发现:(1)“家族-家族”决策权配置模式不利于企业创新，“家族-职业”决策权配置模式有助于企业创新，“职业-家族”决策权配置模式不会对企业创新产生显著影响，“职业-职业”决策权配置模式有助于企业创新。其中，“家族-职业”决策权配置模式对企业创新的积极影响最显著。(2)冗余资源弱化了“家族-家族”以及“家族-职业”两类决策权配置模式与企业创新之间的关系。(3)约束型社会情感财富强化了“家族-家族”以及“家族-职业”两类决策权配置模式与企业创新之间的关系。(4)延伸型社会情感财富一方面弱化了“家族-职业”决策权配置模式与企业创新的正相关关系；另一方面则强化了“职业-职业”决策权配置模式与企业创新的正相关关系。本文从决策权配置的视角来解释家族企业的创新战略，并兼顾了冗余资源与社会情感财富的影响，对家族企业如何设计决策权配置模式具有一定的启示意义。

关键词: 家族企业, 决策权配置, 企业创新, 冗余资源, 社会情感财富

Abstract: Based on the sample of Chinese family firms listed from 2011 to 2016, this paper studies the relationship between family decision rights allocation and corporate innovation. Meanwhile, the moderating effects of slack resources and social-emotional wealth are discussed. The results show that:(1) there is a significant negative correlation between family-family decision rights allocation and corporate innovation, a significant positive correlation between family-occupation decision rights allocation and corporate innovation, no significant relationship between occupation-family decision rights allocation and corporate innovation, and a significant positive correlation between occupation-occupation decision rights allocation and corporate innovation, with the positive impact of family-occupation decision rights allocation being the most significant; (2) for family-family and family-occupation, slack resources weaken the relationship between decision rights allocation and corporate innovation; (3) for family-family and family-occupation, restricted social-emotional wealth strengthens decision rights allocation and corporate innovation; (4) extended social-emotional wealth weakens the relationship between family-occupation decision rights allocation and corporate innovation, and extended social-emotional wealth strengthens the positive correlation between occupation-occupation decision rights allocation and corporate innovation. From the perspective of decision rights allocation, this paper explains the innovation strategy in family firms, and focuses on the influence of slack resources and social-emotional wealth, which has certain enlightenment on how to design the decision rights allocation in family firms.

Key words: family firms, decision rights allocation, corporate innovation, slack resources, socio-emotional wealth

杜善重. 家族决策权配置与企业创新——基于冗余资源与社会情感财富的调节效应[J]. 管理评论, 2022, 34(6): 62-75.

Du Shanzhong. Family Decision Rights Allocation and Corporate Innovation——The Moderating Effects of Slack Resources and Socio-emotional Wealth[J]. Management Review, 2022, 34(6): 62-75.

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