管理评论

管理评论 ›› 2022, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (6): 183-191.

• 市场营销 • 上一篇    下一篇

网络代理商推荐广告引入对双电子渠道定价决策的影响研究

楚明森, 李春发, 周驰, 解雯倩   

  1. 天津理工大学管理学院, 天津 300384
  • 收稿日期:2019-07-12 出版日期:2022-06-28 发布日期:2022-07-22
  • 通讯作者: 周驰(通讯作者),天津理工大学管理学院副教授,博士。
  • 作者简介:楚明森,天津理工大学管理学院硕士研究生;李春发,天津理工大学管理学院教授,博士生导师,博士;解雯倩,天津理工大学管理学院硕士研究生。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金青年项目（71272189）；教育部人文社会科学研究基金项目（17YJC630232）。

Study on the Influence of Online Agent Recommendation Advertising Introduction on the Pricing Decision of Dual Electronic Channel

Chu Mingsen, Li Chunfa, Zhou Chi, Xie Wenqian   

  1. School of Management, Tianjin University of Technology, Tianjin 300384
  • Received:2019-07-12 Online:2022-06-28 Published:2022-07-22

PDF (PC)

180

摘要： 推荐广告引入已成为网络代理商提升代理渠道竞争力的基本方式。在对网络品牌商直销与网络代理商代理的双电子渠道竞争关系分析基础上，构建了涉及网络代理商推荐广告引入的两种双电子渠道最优定价Stackelberg博弈模型，探讨推荐广告引入与推荐广告投入水平、消费者网络代理渠道接受度间的关系及其对双电子渠道最优定价决策的影响。研究表明:推荐广告引入能拓展网络代理商市场，其最佳引入时机与推荐广告投入水平、消费者网络代理渠道接受度密切相关；推荐广告引入将促使网络品牌商降低产品直销价格而提高批发价格，增加网络代理商的价格竞争压力；推荐广告引入与否，网络代理商产品最优售价均随消费者网络代理渠道接受度增大而增大。代理商在合理的推荐广告投入水平区间内引入推荐广告，将有助于市场需求的扩张。而推荐广告引入将使网络品牌商产品最优直销价格下降、批发价格上升，网络代理商产品最优销售价格将随推荐广告投入水平提高而上升。

关键词: 双电子渠道, 推荐广告, 网络代理, Stackelberg博弈

Abstract: The introduction of advertising has become a basic way for network agents to enhance the competitiveness of agency channel.Based on competition relationship analysis of online brand direct sales and online agent of dual electronic channels,this paper establishes Stackelberg game models that involves two optimal pricings of recommendation advertising of online agent introduction.We discuss the relationship between the introduction of recommendation advertising and the recommendation advertising investment level and the online agency channel acceptability of consumers,and these factors' influence on the optimal pricing decision of dual electronic channels.The results show that the introduction of recommendation advertising can expand the online agent market,and its optimal introduction time is closely related to the recommendation advertising investment level and the online agency channel acceptability of consumers.The introduction of recommendation advertising will promote the online brand to reduce the direct selling price and increase the wholesale price,and increase the price competition pressure of online agent.No matter whether recommendation advertising is introduced or not,the optimal selling price of online agent increases with the online agency channel acceptability of consumers.The introduction of recommendation advertising by online agent within a reasonable level of recommendation advertising input level will contribute to the expansion of market demand.If the recommendation advertising is introduced,the optimal direct selling price of online brand decreases and the optimal wholesale price increases,while the optimal selling price of online agent increases with the input of recommendation advertising.The introduction of recommendation advertising will decrease the optimal direct selling price and increase the wholesale price of online brand product,and the optimal selling price of online agency will increase with the increase of the recommendation advertising input level.

Key words: dual electronic channel, recommendation advertising, online agency, Stackelberg game