高管廉洁抑制了大股东掏空吗？——来自中国国有上市公司的经验证据

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文以高管拥有纪委身份作为高管廉洁的代理变量，选取2011—2017年间中国资本市场A股国有上市公司为研究样本，基于大股东掏空的视角考察高管廉洁在公司治理中所发挥的作用。研究发现，高管廉洁能够显著抑制大股东掏空行为，表现为高管廉洁程度越高，对大股东掏空的抑制作用越强。相对于中央国有企业，上述抑制作用在地方国有企业中显著增强。基于经济后果的进一步测试显示，高管廉洁降低了企业的经营风险，且大股东掏空在这一过程中发挥了部分中介作用。以上结果表明，高管廉洁在公司治理中发挥着积极作用，有利于保护投资者利益，降低企业经营风险。本文研究丰富了大股东掏空影响因素文献，同时为高管廉洁的治理效应提供了直接经验证据。

关键词: 高管廉洁, 大股东掏空, 国有企业, 国企性质, 经营风险

Abstract: Using executives who are also discipline commission members as a proxy variable for executive integrity, this paper uses A-share state-owned listed companies in China ’s capital market from 2011 to 2017 as samples to test the role of executive integrity in corporate governance from the perspective of major shareholders’ tunneling. The research shows that executive integrity can significantly inhibit major shareholders’ tunneling behaviors. And the higher level of integrity executives have, the more effectively major shareholders’ tunneling will be restrained. This restraint is more obvious in local SOEs than in central SOEs. Further testing based on economic consequences reveals that executive integrity reduces business risk, and major shareholders’ tunneling play a partial mediating role in the above process. The above results show that integrity of executive plays an active role in corporate governance, which is conducive to protecting investors’ interests and reducing business risks. This paper contributes to the literature that focuses on the factors influencing shareholders’ tunneling, and provides a direct empirical evidence for governance effects of executive integrity.

Key words: executive integrity, major shareholders’ tunneling, SOEs, nature of SOEs, business risks

周泽将, 雷玲, 王彪华. 高管廉洁抑制了大股东掏空吗？——来自中国国有上市公司的经验证据[J]. 管理评论, 2022, 34(4): 279-292.

Zhou Zejiang, Lei Ling, Wang Biaohua. Does Executive Integrity Restrain Major Shareholders’ Tunneling?——Empirical Evidence from Chinese State-owned Listed Companies[J]. Management Review, 2022, 34(4): 279-292.

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