管理评论

管理评论 ›› 2022, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (11): 65-74.

• 技术与创新管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

CEO激励、风险偏好与企业创新

苏日娜1,2, 程新生1,3, 杨晓萍1, 黄立新4   

  1. 1. 南开大学商学院, 天津 300071;
    2. 内蒙古财经大学会计学院, 呼和浩特 010000;
    3. 南开大学中国公司治理研究院, 天津 300071;
    4. 内蒙古民族大学管理学院, 通辽 028000
  • 收稿日期:2020-09-01 出版日期:2022-11-28 发布日期:2022-12-30
  • 作者简介:苏日娜,南开大学商学院博士研究生,内蒙古财经大学会计学院讲师;程新生,南开大学商学院、南开大学中国公司治理研究院教授,博士生导师,博士;杨晓萍,南开大学商学院硕士研究生;黄立新,内蒙古民族大学管理学院副教授,博士。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金面上项目(72272081;71972105)。

CEO Incentive, Risk Appetite and Enterprise Innovation

Su Rina1,2, Cheng Xinsheng1,3, Yang Xiaoping1, Huang Lixin4   

  1. 1. School of Business, Nankai University, Tianjin 300071;
    2. School of Accounting, Inner Mongolia University of Finance & Economics, Hohhot 010000;
    3. Academy of China Corporate Governance, Nankai University, Tianjin 300071;
    4. School of Management, Inner Mongolia Minzu University, Tongliao 028000
  • Received:2020-09-01 Online:2022-11-28 Published:2022-12-30

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摘要： 在创新决策中,CEO发挥着重要作用。本文以2012—2018年中国沪深两市A股上市公司作为研究对象,探究CEO风险偏好对企业创新激励效果的影响。研究发现,给予CEO创新管理收益和给予CEO创新失败包容都能够促进企业创新,对于风险偏好度低的CEO而言,给予其创新失败包容对企业创新的促进作用更强;而对于风险偏好度高的CEO而言,给予其创新管理收益对企业创新的促进作用更强。进一步分析表明,企业产权性质和行业竞争对CEO风险偏好的调节效应具有异质性影响。对于给予CEO创新管理收益的激励方式,可能会出现由于CEO风险偏好度高而导致创新激励缺乏效率的问题。本文拓展了有关企业创新影响因素的研究,揭示了CEO创新激励特征,为建立有效的CEO创新激励机制提供了经验证据和理论依据,为优化公司治理机制提供了借鉴。

关键词: CEO激励, 风险偏好, 企业创新, 创新收益, 创新风险

Abstract: We explore how different CEO innovation incentive methods are associated with corporate innovation, and whether innovation incentive effect varies with CEO’s risk appetite. We focus on two mechanisms: giving CEO innovation management income and accepting CEO innovation failure. For our analyses, we use China’s A-share listed companies from 2012 to 2018 as research objects. We find that both giving CEO innovation management income and accepting CEO innovation failure can promote the innovation of companies. But with the change of CEO risk appetite, the two mechanisms different promotion effects. For CEOs with low risk appetite, providing incentives is better able to promote innovation than accepting CEO innovation failure. For CEOs with high risk appetite, giving them innovation management income is a more effective way to do so. Further analysis shows that the moderating effect of CEO’s risk preference is heterogeneous based on enterprise nature and industry competition. And giving CEO’s innovation management income may lead to inefficiency of innovation incentives because of the CEO’ s high risk preference.This paper expands the research of innovation incentive, reveals the characteristics of CEO innovation incentive, provides empirical evidence and theoretical basis for establishing an effective CEO innovation incentive mechanism, and provides a reference for optimizing corporate governance mechanism.

Key words: CEO incentive, risk appetite, enterprise innovation, innovation revenue, innovation risk