环境保护、地方官员晋升与企业融资

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 改革开放后，我国经济取得举世瞩目的发展成就，与此同时，环境污染问题也越来越严重。为了实现经济健康可持续发展，中央及各级地方政府颁布一系列政策和文件，这些政策和文件的效果如何？本文以中共中央组织部2013年12月颁布的《关于改进地方党政领导班子和领导干部政绩考核工作的通知》（下文简称《通知》）为研究对象，对此进行研究。具体而言，本文研究了《通知》对高污染企业融资的影响，研究结果表明：《通知》显著抑制了高污染企业的负债融资，经济发展水平对上述关系具有正向调节作用；《通知》对高污染企业的权益融资没有显著影响。本文为晋升锦标赛理论提供了微观实证依据。

关键词: 环境保护, 政治晋升, 企业融资, 高污染企业

Abstract: After the reform and opening up, China has achieved tremendous economic success. To explain this phenomenon, scholars have developed two different theories. The first is Fiscal Federalism Theory, and the second is Promotion Tournament Theory. Along with its high-speed economic growth, China faces the problem of dramatic environmental deterioration. To solve this problem, Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee promulgates a regulation about the performance evaluation of subnational government officials, which includes environmental protection indexes in it. What is the effect of the regulation? This paper makes an analysis of it. Using Difference-in-Differences method (DID) and panel data of Chinese listed companies over the period of 2010-2016, we find that the change of performance evaluation indexes of local officials will affect the behaviors of local officials, and then affect the operating activities of enterprises. Compared with low-polluting enterprises, debt financing in high-polluting enterprises decreases significantly after the regulation. We use a rich set of tests to show that the baseline results are robust to endogeneity and reverse causality. Then we test whether economic development level and regional pollution degree affect the regulation. Empirical results show that the regulation is more effective in developed provinces and in high-polluted provinces. This conclusion provides an empirical support for the Promotion Tournament Theory.

Key words: environmental protection, political promotion, financing, high-polluting enterprise

冯志华. 环境保护、地方官员晋升与企业融资[J]. 管理评论, 2021, 33(8): 41-52.

Feng Zhihua. Environmental Protection, Promotion of Local Officials and Enterprise Financing[J]. Management Review, 2021, 33(8): 41-52.

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