国有上市公司应收账款的市场折价：证据与机制解释

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文以非国有上市公司为参照，估算了我国国有上市公司应收账款的市场价值。研究发现，相比于非国有上市公司，国有上市公司的应收账款存在更大的市场折价效应，而且其应收账款质量显著更低。本文基于代理冲突视角，从监督和激励两个主要方面为解释中国A股国有上市公司应收账款高折价之谜提供了理论和实证支持。在监督层面，来自审计师、非国有股东、董事会、机构投资者和媒体的监督力量越弱时，国有企业的应收账款价值显著更低。在激励层面，相对薪酬和管理层持股激励程度越低时，国有企业的应收账款价值也显著更低。本文从应收账款折价的角度，提供了中国国有上市公司代理问题较为严重的新证据，并为国有企业反腐和监管提供了新的启示。

关键词: 应收账款, 代理冲突, 公司价值

Abstract: Using non-state-owned listed companies as a benchmark, this paper estimates the market value of the accounts receivable of the state-owned listed companies in China. We find that SOEs' accounts receivables in China do have significantly lower market value and lower quality than these of non-SOEs. Further, we provide evidence that low market value of accounts receivables for SOEs is attributed to the severer agency problems in SOEs. We find that the value of accounts receivables is significantly lower in SOEs with lower supervision from audits, with lower proportion of non-state-owned shares, with CEO duality, and with more media coverage, as well as with lower proportion of institutional investor shares. Also, we find the value of accounts receivables is significantly lower in SOEs with lower relative monetary compensation and with lower management shareholding proportion. Based on perspective of accounts receivables, our paper provides new evidences of the agency conflicts, and provides new enlightenments for the anti-corruption and regulation of SOEs.

Key words: accounts receivables, agency conflicts, firm value

应千伟, 刘劲松. 国有上市公司应收账款的市场折价：证据与机制解释[J]. 管理评论, 2021, 33(8): 263-277.

Ying Qianwei, Liu Jinsong. The Discounted Value of Accounts Receivables in State-owned Enterprises: Evidence and Mechanism Explanation[J]. Management Review, 2021, 33(8): 263-277.

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