邻避项目公众-政府代理人博弈模型——基于公平感知视角

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文构建了一个考虑公平感知的公众-政府代理人博弈模型，尝试将邻避问题处理过程中公众与政府之间的谈判抽象为基于各主体代理人得益的多阶段博弈过程，并寻求公众最优期望定期补偿与政府最优实际定期补偿策略的协调。本文还结合具体案例与数值模拟对所得结论做进一步阐释。研究表明：（1）公众期望定期补偿随项目社会总效益与总规模相关度及项目危害改善度递增，随项目惠及公众数递减。政府最优补偿随项目危害改善度递增，随项目社会总效益与总规模相关度递减，随项目惠及公众数递增。（2）项目危害性越高、公众心理损失和固定资产贬值越大、不合作时间越长，公众最优期望补偿反而越低。（3）公众调整后的最优期望补偿还会随政府政绩、税收及项目利润递增，政府补偿也应随之递增。但项目危害性对受损公众数的影响越大，公众在次轮博弈中的期望补偿越高，政府则应当支付较低补偿。（4）距离敏感型公众对最优补偿的期望值相对较低且随公平感知递增；距离不敏感型公众对最优补偿的期望值较高且随公平感知递减。（5）政府补偿略高于公众期望值，政府应给予距离不敏感型公众较低补偿，但该补偿随公众公平关切递增；给予距离敏感型公众较高补偿且随公平关切递减，从而维持补偿的公平性。这些结论对政府控制补偿成本、实施最优补偿策略，化解邻避冲突具有重要的现实参考意义。

关键词: 邻避治理, 公平感知, 代理人博弈, 最优补偿

Abstract: This paper builds a resident-government agent game model with fairness perception. It tries to abstract the negotiation between resident and government as a multi-stage game based on the benefits of agents in NIMBY problem, to find the equilibrium of optimal compensation strategy. We further combine case analysis and numerical simulation to explain the results. Our study shows that:(1) Resident's expectation compensation increases with the degree of correlation between the total social benefit and the project scale and the degree of improvement of the project hazard, decreases with the number of resident project benefit. The optimal government compensation increases with the degree of improvement of project hazards, decreases with the degree of correlation between the total social benefits and the project, increases with the number of resident project benefit. (2) The higher the project harmfulness, the greater the public psychological loss and the devaluation of fixed assets, and the longer the non-cooperation time, the lower the resident's optimal expectation compensation. (3) The resident's adjusted optimal expected compensation will also increase with the government performance, tax revenue and project profits, and the government compensation should also increase with it. However, the greater the impact of project hazards on the number of damaged residents, the higher the resident's expected compensation in the next round of game, the lower the compensation the government should pay. (4) The expectation of distance-sensitive public for optimal compensation is relatively low and increases with fair perception; the expectation of distance-insensitive public for optimal compensation is higher and decreases with fair perception. (5) Government compensation is slightly higher than the public expectations, and the government should give the distance-insensitive public lower compensation, but the compensation increases with the public's fair concern; the distance-sensitive public should be given higher compensation and decrease with the fair concern, so as to maintain the fairness of compensation. These results have important practical reference for the government to control the cost of compensation and to solve the NIMBY conflict.

Key words: solution to NIMBY conflict, fairness perception, resident-government agent game, optimal compensation

李亚东, 邹安琼. 邻避项目公众-政府代理人博弈模型——基于公平感知视角[J]. 管理评论, 2021, 33(7): 313-325.

Li Yadong, Zou Anqiong. The Resident-Government Agent Game Analysis of NIMBY——Based on the Perspective of Fairness Perception[J]. Management Review, 2021, 33(7): 313-325.

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