中央环保督察下的地方环境治理行为发生机制——基于30个案例的fsQCA分析

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 中央环保督察是环境领域"督政"的重要制度，其直接作用对象是地方政府环境治理行为，地方政府行为是动力和约束两个维度多种因素综合交织的结果。基于此，本文从地方政府环境治理行为的动力及所受约束出发，构建中央环保督察压力下的地方环境治理行为发生机制的分析框架。以2018年被督察的30个案例为研究对象，采取模糊集定性比较分析方法（fsQCA）探究压力和约束共六个条件变量相互交织对地方环境治理行为的复杂作用机制。结果显示，地方环境治理行为的发生有两种路径：①环保压力驱动模式，环保压力是地方环境治理行为发生的关键因素；②拐点型模式，经济约束与资源约束是地方环境治理行为发生的重要影响因素。基于上述分析，本文从完善地方政府生态政绩考评体系，健全环境治理领域转移支付制度和财政税收政策及完善公众参与机制提出政策启示。

关键词: 中央环保督察, 地方政府环境治理行为, 行为动力, 约束条件, 模糊集定性比较分析

Abstract: The Central Environmental Protection Inspection is an important system of "supervision" in the environmental field. Its direct object is the environmental governance behavior of the local government. The behavior of the local government is the result of a comprehensive interweaving of multiple factors in the two dimensions of motivation and constraint. Based on this, this paper starts from the motivation and constraints of local government's pollution control behavior, and builds an analysis framework of the local environmental governance mechanism under the pressure of the central environmental protection inspection. Taking 30 cases inspected in 2018 as the research objects, the fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis method (fsQCA) is adopted to explore the complex mechanism of the interaction of six conditional variables of pressure and constraint on local environmental governance behavior. The results show that there are two paths for the occurrence of local environmental governance behaviors:①Environmental protection pressure-driven mode, environmental pressure is the key factor in the occurrence of local environmental governance behavior; ②Inflection point model, economic constraints and resource constraints are important for local environmental governance behaviors Influencing factors. Based on the above analysis, this paper proposes that policies should be aimed at improving the local government's ecological performance evaluation system, improving the transfer payment system and fiscal and taxation policies in the field of environmental governance, and improving the public participation mechanism.

Key words: Central Environmental Inspection, local government pollution control behavior, behavioral motivation, constraint conditions, fu zzy-set qualitative comparative analysis

张国兴, 林伟纯, 郎玫. 中央环保督察下的地方环境治理行为发生机制——基于30个案例的fsQCA分析[J]. 管理评论, 2021, 33(7): 326-336.

Zhang Guoxing, Lin Weichun, Lang Mei. Local Environmental Governance Behavior Generation Mechanism under the Central Environmental Protection Inspection——-Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis Based on 30 Cases[J]. Management Review, 2021, 33(7): 326-336.

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