管理评论

管理评论 ›› 2021, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (5): 134-141.

• 物理-事理-人理系统方法论（WSR） • 上一篇    下一篇

薪酬契约视角下高管薪酬粘性形成机理研究——基于WSR方法论的诠释

孙世敏, 张汉南, 马智颖   

  1. 东北大学工商管理学院, 沈阳 110169
  • 收稿日期:2019-05-24 出版日期:2021-05-28 发布日期:2021-06-03
  • 通讯作者: 张汉南(通讯作者),东北大学工商管理学院博士研究生
  • 作者简介:孙世敏,东北大学工商管理学院教授,博士生导师,博士;马智颖,东北大学工商管理学院博士研究生。
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金一般项目（17BGL244）。

Research on the Formation Mechanism of Executive Compensation Stickiness from the Perspective of Compensation Contract——Based on the Interpretation of WSR Methodology

Sun Shimin, Zhang Hannan, Ma Zhiying   

  1. School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110169
  • Received:2019-05-24 Online:2021-05-28 Published:2021-06-03

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摘要： 本文以WSR方法论诠释高管薪酬契约设计中的物理、事理和人理内涵，并依据物理和事理将高管努力划分为“盈利性努力”与“基本面特征努力”，引入股东激励偏好、高管努力及风险规避偏好等人理因素构建多任务委托代理模型，基于薪酬契约视角探索高管薪酬粘性形成机理及影响因素。研究发现：（1）作为高管薪酬契约设计的重要考量因素，基本面特征对公司未来收益的贡献度越大，高管薪酬粘性特征越明显，证明薪酬粘性一定程度上是股东对高管补偿性激励的重要制度安排。（2）股东激励偏好、高管努力及风险规避偏好对高管薪酬粘性产生重要影响。其中，股东短期激励偏好越强，高管风险规避度越大，高管薪酬粘性特征越弱；高管盈利性努力偏好与薪酬粘性呈倒“U”型关系。

关键词: 薪酬粘性, 薪酬契约, 多任务委托代理模型, WSR方法论

Abstract: This paper interprets the wuli, shili and renli in the design of executive compensation contract by WSR methodology, divides the executive effort into two types of “profit-making efforts” and “fundamentals efforts” according to wuli and shili and introduces shareholder incentive preference, executive effort preference and executive risk aversion preference to construct the multitask principal-agent model in order to explore the formation mechanism and influencing factors of executive compensation stickiness based on the perspective of compensation contract. The results are as follows: (1) As an important influence factor in the design of executive compensation contract, the greater the contribution degree of fundamental characteristics to company's future income is, the more obvious the executive compensation stickiness is, which proves that compensation stickiness is an important institutional arrangement for shareholders to reward executives in a certain extent. (2) Shareholder incentive preference, executive effort preference and executive risk aversion preference have an important impact on compensation stickiness. The stronger the shareholder short-term incentive preference and the executive risk avoidance degree are, the weaker the executive compensation stickiness is; the relationship of inverted “U” type exists between executive profit effort preference and compensation stickiness.

Key words: compensation stickiness, compensation contract, multitask principal-agent model, WSR methodology