政策不确定性与企业的非市场战略——基于中国家族上市公司的实证分析

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 家族企业在何种情境下倾向于诉诸非市场战略，这一学术问题广受关注但并没有一致的结论。本文基于政策不确定性视角，检验了官员更替与家族企业非市场战略构建之间的关系，并基于中国沪深上市公司的面板数据进行了实证分析。结果发现：政策不确定性明显提高了家族企业的非市场战略投入，但这种作用也受到了企业业绩状况以及媒体报道的影响。具体而言，随着期望落差的增加，政策不确定性对家族企业非市场战略投入的正向作用也随之增强；而媒体报道则在一定程度上修正了政策不确定性对家族企业非市场战略投入的正向作用。进一步研究发现，较低的政策不确定性（市委书记来自本地或反腐败政策执行之后）将减弱家族企业的非市场战略动机。本文的研究结果表明，因地方官员更替产生的政策不确定性是导致家族企业非市场战略投入的一个重要原因，但媒体的外部治理和反腐败政策能够在一定程度上约束企业的行为，上述研究结论支持了正在进行中的政治体制改革和反腐败政策。

关键词: 政策不确定性, 非市场战略, 期望落差, 媒体报道, 反腐败政策

Abstract: In what context family firms tend to resort to non-market strategies? This academic issue has attracted wide attention, but there is no consistent conclusion. Based on the perspective of policy uncertainty, this paper examines the construction mechanism of family firms' non-market strategy during the change of officials by using the event of "quasi-natural experiment" such as the replacement of the secretary of the regional municipal party committee. An empirical analysis is carried out based on the panel data of listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen in China. The results show that policy uncertainty significantly increases the non-market strategic investment, but this role is also affected by corporate performance and media reports. Specifically, the response of those family firms in the state of aspiration gap will be more obvious, that is, with the increase of aspiration gap, the positive effect of policy uncertainty on family firm's non-market strategic investment will also increase. At the same time, this paper finds that media reports correct the positive effect of policy uncertainty on family firm's non-market strategic investment to a certain extent.
Further study finds that lower policy uncertainty (the municipal party secretary comes from the local or the implementation of anti-corruption policies) will weaken the non-market strategic motivation of family firms. The results of this paper show that the policy uncertainty caused by the change of local leaders is an important reason for the non-market strategic investment of family firms. However, the external governance and anti-corruption policies of the media can restrain the behavior of firms to a certain extent. The above research conclusions support the ongoing political system reform and anti-corruption policies.

Key words: policy uncertainty, non-market strategy, performance aspiration, media coverage, anti-corruption policy

朱丽娜, 贺小刚, 高皓. 政策不确定性与企业的非市场战略——基于中国家族上市公司的实证分析[J]. 管理评论, 2021, 33(10): 273-288.

Zhu Lina, He Xiaogang, Gao Hao. Policy Uncertainty and Firms' Non-Market Strategy——An Empirical Analysis Based on Listed Chinese Family Companies[J]. Management Review, 2021, 33(10): 273-288.

参考文献

[1] Markman G. D., Gianiodis P. T., Buchholtz A. K. Factor-Market Rivalry[J]. Academy of Management Review, 2009,34(3):423-441
[2] Iriyama A., Kishore R., Talukdar D. Playing Dirty or Building Capability? Corruption and HR Training as Competitive Actions to Threats from Informal and Foreign Firm Rivals[J]. Strategic Management Journal, 2016,37(10):2152-2173
[3] Derfus P. J., Maggitti P. G., Grimm C. M., et al. The Red Queen Effect:Competitive Actions and Firm Performance[J]. Academy of Management Journal, 2008,51(1):61-80
[4] Hillman A. J., Hitt M. A. Corporate Political Strategy Formulation:A Model of Approach, Participation, and Strategy Decisions[J]. Academy of Management Review, 1999,24(4):825-842
[5] Doh J. P., Rodriguez P., Uhlenbruck K., et al. Coping with Corruption in Foreign Markets[J]. Academy of Management Perspectives, 2003,17(3):114-127
[6] Uhlenbruck K., Rodriguez P., Doh J., et al. The Impact of Corruption on Entry Strategy:Evidence from Telecommunication Projects in Emerging Economies[J]. Organization Science, 2006,17(3):402-414
[7] 周小宇,符国群,王锐. 关系导向战略与创新导向战略是相互替代还是互为补充——来自中国私营企业的证据[J]. 南开管理评论, 2016,19(4):13-26
[8] 杨其静. 企业成长:政治关联还是能力建设?[J]. 经济研究, 2011,46(10):54-66
[9] 党力,杨瑞龙,杨继东. 反腐败与企业创新:基于政治关联的解释[J]. 中国工业经济, 2015,(7):146-160
[10] Scott W. R. Institutions and Organizations[M]. Thousand Oak, CA:Sage Press, 1995
[11] DiMaggio P. J., Powell W. W. The Iron Cage Revisited:Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields[J]. American Sociological Review, 1983,48(2):147-160
[12] North D. C. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance[M]. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1990
[13] 徐业坤,钱先航,李维安. 政治不确定性, 政治关联与民营企业投资——来自市委书记更替的证据[J]. 管理世界, 2013,(5):116-130
[14] 陈德球,陈运森. 政策不确定性与上市公司盈余管理[J]. 经济研究, 2018,53(6):99-113
[15] 罗党论,廖俊平,王珏. 地方官员变更与企业风险——基于中国上市公司的经验证据[J]. 经济研究, 2016,51(5):130-142
[16] 陈德球,金雅玲,董志勇. 政策不确定性, 政治关联与企业创新效率[J]. 南开管理评论, 2016,19(4):27-35
[17] 曹春方. 政治权力转移与公司投资:中国的逻辑[J]. 管理世界, 2013,(1):151-165
[18] Gómez-Mejía L. R., Haynes K. T., Núñez-Nickel M., et al. Socioemotional Wealth and Business Risks in Family-Controlled Firms:Evidence from Spanish Olive Oil Mills[J]. Administrative Science Quarterly, 2007,52(1):106-137
[19] Gómez-Mejía L. R., Makri M., Kintana M. L. Diversification Decisions in Family-Controlled Firms[J]. Journal of Management Studies, 2010,47(2):223-252
[20] 钱先航,徐业坤. 官员变动、政治身份与民营上市公司的风险承担[J]. 经济学(季刊), 2014,13(4):1437-1460
[21] Diebold F. X., Yilmaz K. Measuring Financial Asset Return and Volatility Spillovers, with Application to Global Equity Markets[J]. Economic Journal, 2009,119(534):158-171
[22] Arnold I. J. M., Vrugt E. B. Treasury Bond Volatility and Uncertainty about Monetary Policy[J]. Financial Review, 2010,45(3):707-728
[23] Julio B., Yook Y. Political Uncertainty and Corporate Investment Cycles[J]. The Journal of Finance, 2012,67(1):45-83
[24] 戴亦一,潘越,冯舒. 中国企业的慈善捐赠是一种"政治献金" 吗?——来自市委书记更替的证据[J]. 经济研究, 2014,49(2):74-86
[25] 陈德球,陈运森,董志勇. 政策不确定性、税收征管强度与企业税收规避[J]. 管理世界, 2016,(5):151-163
[26] 贺小刚,张远飞,连燕玲,等. 政治关联与企业价值——民营企业与国有企业的比较分析[J]. 中国工业经济, 2013,(1):103-115
[27] 张建君,张志学. 中国民营企业家的政治战略[J]. 管理世界, 2005,(7):94-105
[28] 潘越,宁博,肖金利. 地方政治权力转移与政企关系重建——来自地方官员更替与高管变更的证据[J]. 中国工业经济, 2015,(6):135-147
[29] Epstein A. L. Matupit:Land, Politics, and Change among the Tolai of New Britain[M]. California:University of California Press, 1969
[30] Krueger A. O. The Political Economy of the Rent-seeking Society[J]. The American Economic Review, 1974,64(3):291-303
[31] 贺小刚,李婧,吕斐斐,等. 绩优企业的投机经营行为分析——来自中国上市公司的数据检验[J]. 中国工业经济, 2015,(5):110-121
[32] Berrone P., Cruz C., Gomez-Mejia L. R., et al. Socioemotional Wealth and Corporate Responses to Institutional Pressures:Do Family-controlled Firms Pollute Less?[J]. Administrative Science Quarterly, 2010,55(1):82-113
[33] Eddleston K. A., Kidwell R. E. Parent-child Relationships:Planting the Seeds of Deviant Behavior in the Family Firm[J]. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 2012,36(2):369-386
[34] Kidwell L. A., Kidwell R. E. Fraud in the Family:How Family Firm Characteristics can Shape Illegal Behavior[R]. Conference:American Accounting Association Annual Meeting, 2010
[35] Boubakri N., Guedhami O., Mishra D., et al. Political Connections and the Cost of Equity Capital[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2012,18(3):541-559
[36] Cull R., Xu L. C. Institutions, Ownership, and Finance:The Determinants of Profit Reinvestment among Chinese Firms[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2005,77(1):117-146
[37] 吴文锋,吴冲锋,芮萌. 中国上市公司高管的政府背景与税收优惠[J]. 管理世界, 2009,(3):134-142
[38] 余明桂,回雅甫,潘红波. 政治联系、寻租与地方政府财政补贴有效性[J]. 经济研究, 2010,45(3):65-77
[39] Chrisman J. J., Patel P. C. Variations in R&D Investments of Family and Nonfamily Firms:Behavioral Agency and Myopic Loss Aversion Perspectives[J]. Academy of Management Journal, 2012,55(4):976-997
[40] Cyert R. M., March J. A Behavioral Theory of the Firm[M]. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:Prentice Hall Press, 1963
[41] Fiegenbaum A., Hart S., Schendel D. Strategic Reference Point Theory[J]. Strategic Management Journal, 1996,17(3):219-235
[42] Wiseman R. M., Gomez-Mejia L. R. A Behavioral Agency Model of Managerial Risk Taking[J]. Academy of Management Review, 1998,23(1):133-153
[43] Gomez-Mejia L. R., Patel P. C., Zellweger T. M. In the Horns of the Dilemma:Socioemotional Wealth, Financial Wealth, and Acquisitions in Family Firms[J]. Journal of Management, 2018,44(4):1369-1397
[44] 宋凌云,王贤彬,徐现祥. 地方官员引领产业结构变动[J]. 经济学(季刊), 2013,12(1):71-92
[45] Beneish M. D. The Detection of Earnings Manipulation[J]. Financial Analysts Journal, 1999,55(5):24-36
[46] Gomez-Mejia L. R., Makri M., Kintana M. L. Diversification Decisions in Family-controlled Firms[J]. Journal of Management Studies, 2010,47(2):223-252
[47] Xu D., Zhou K. Z., Du F. Deviant versus Aspirational Risk Taking:The Effects of Performance Feedback on Bribery Expenditure and R&D Intensity[J]. Academy of Management Journal, 2019,62(4):1226-1251
[48] Dutton J. E., Dukerich J. M., Harquail C. V. Organizational Images and Member Identification[J]. Administrative Science Quarterly, 1994,39(2):239-263
[49] Scott S. G., Lane V. R. A Stakeholder Approach to Organizational Identity[J]. Academy of Management Review, 2000,25(1):43-62
[50] Dyer Jr W. G., Whetten D. A. Family Firms and Social Responsibility:Preliminary Evidence from the S&P 500[J]. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 2006,30(6):785-802
[51] Zellweger T. M., Eddleston K. A., Kellermanns F. W. Exploring the Concept of Familiness:Introducing Family Firm Identity[J]. Journal of Family Business Strategy, 2010,1(1):54-63
[52] Pollock T. G., Rindova V. P., Maggitti P. G. Market Watch:Information and Availability Cascades among the Media and Investors in the US IPO Market[J]. Academy of Management Journal, 2008,51(2):335-358
[53] Pollock T. G., Rindova V. P. Media Legitimation Effects in the Market for Initial Public Offerings[J]. Academy of Management Journal, 2003,46(5):631-642
[54] 纪炀,周二华,蒋国银. 媒体报道、战略惯性与企业绩效——基于中国上市公司的经验证据[J]. 管理评论, 2019,31(12):15-28
[55] Vaara E., Monin P. A Recursive Perspective on Discursive Legitimation and Organizational Action in Mergers and Acquisitions[J]. Organization Science, 2010,21(1):3-22
[56] Cennamo C., Berrone P., Cruz C., et al. Socioemotional Wealth and Proactive Stakeholder Engagement:Why Family-controlled Firms Care More about Their Stakeholders[J]. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 2012,36(6):1153-1173
[57] Siegel D. S., Vitaliano D. F. An Empirical Analysis of the Strategic Use of Corporate Social Responsibility[J]. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2007,16(3):773-792
[58] Zeng Y., Lee E., Zhang J. Value Relevance of Alleged Corporate Bribery Expenditures Implied by Accounting Information[J]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 2016,35(6):592-608
[59] Zhu B. MNCs, Rents, and Corruption:Evidence from China[J]. American Journal of Political Science, 2017,61(1):84-99
[60] 贺小刚,邓浩,吴诗雨,等. 赶超压力与公司的败德行为——来自中国上市公司的数据分析[J]. 管理世界, 2015,(9):104-124
[61] 金宇超,靳庆鲁,宣扬. "不作为" 或"急于表现":企业投资中的政治动机[J]. 经济研究, 2016,51(10):126-139
[62] 申慧慧,于鹏,吴联生. 国有股权、环境不确定性与投资效率[J]. 经济研究, 2012,7(11):113-126
[63] Marquis C., Qiao K. Waking from Mao's Dream:Communist Ideological Imprinting and the Internationalization of Entrepreneurial Ventures in China[J]. Administrative Science Quarterly, 2020,65(3):795-830
[64] 申宇,傅立立,赵静梅. 市委书记变动对企业寻租影响的实证研究[J]. 中国工业经济, 2015,(9):37-52
[65] Cerqua A., Pellegrini G. Do Subsidies to Private Capital Boost Firms' Growth? A Multiple Regression Discontinuity Design Approach[J]. Journal of Public Economics, 2014,109:114-126