管理评论

管理评论 ›› 2021, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (10): 195-207.

• 组织行为与人力资源管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

高管薪酬粘性形成机理与传导路径研究——基于薪酬外部公平性视角

孙世敏, 张汉南   

  1. 东北大学工商管理学院, 沈阳 110169
  • 收稿日期:2018-10-15 出版日期:2021-10-28 发布日期:2021-11-29
  • 通讯作者: 张汉南(通讯作者),东北大学工商管理学院博士研究生
  • 作者简介:孙世敏,东北大学工商管理学院教授,博士生导师,博士。
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金一般项目（17BGL244）。

Research on the Formation Mechanism and Conduction Path of Executive Compensation Stickiness——Based on the Perspective of Compensation External Equity

Sun Shimin, Zhang Hannan   

  1. School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110169
  • Received:2018-10-15 Online:2021-10-28 Published:2021-11-29

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摘要： 现有研究大都将高管薪酬粘性归为代理问题，认为薪酬粘性是公司治理不善引起的。本文以2013—2016年中国沪深A股上市公司为研究对象，从薪酬外部公平性视角探索高管薪酬粘性形成机理与传导路径，得到如下三点结论：（1）薪酬外部负向不公平加剧了高管薪酬粘性特征，薪酬外部正向不公平缓解了高管薪酬粘性特征，证明薪酬粘性并非都是代理问题，一定程度上是公司为缓解薪酬外部负向不公平而给予高管的替代性补偿机制；（2）薪酬外部负向不公平会引起薪酬结构调整，隐性薪酬比例提升在薪酬外部负向不公平加剧高管薪酬粘性过程中具有中介遮掩效应；（3）薪酬管制较强时薪酬外部负向不公平加剧高管薪酬粘性的作用更明显，证明薪酬粘性并非单纯的管理漏洞，薪酬管制制度是高管薪酬粘性产生的重要助力。

关键词: 薪酬粘性, 薪酬外部公平性, 薪酬管制, 隐性薪酬比例

Abstract: Most of the existing studies classify executive compensation stickiness under the agency topic and hold that executive compensation stickiness is caused by poor corporate governance. Taking the Chinese A-share listed companies from 2013-2016 as research object, this paper explores the formation mechanism and conduction path of executive compensation stickiness in the perspective of compensation external equity. The main conclusions are as follows:(1) The external negative unfairness of compensation intensifies the executive compensation stickiness and the external positive unfairness of compensation relieves the compensation stickiness, which proves that compensation stickiness is not always an agency issue and possibly an alternative compensation mechanism of alleviating the negative unfair compensation to a certain extent. (2) The compensation structure adjustment will be caused by the compensation external negative unfairness and the increase of implicit compensation proportion has an intermediary cover-up effect when compensation external negative unfairness aggravates executive compensation stickiness. (3) The effect of compensation external negative unfairness aggravating executive compensation stickiness is more obvious when compensation regulation is strong, which proves that compensation stickiness is not a simple management loophole and the compensation control system is an important contribution to the executive compensation stickiness.

Key words: compensation stickiness, external equity of compensation, compensation regulation, implicit compensation proportion