管理评论

管理评论 ›› 2020, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (9): 280-295.

• 会计与财务管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

谁更能顺水推舟？来自并购绩效影响因素的经验证据

王艳1, 徐淑芳2, 何竺虔3   

  1. 1. 广东外语外贸大学会计学院, 广州 510006;
    2. 华南理工大学经济与贸易学院, 广州 510006;
    3. 广东财经大学会计学院, 广州 510320
  • 收稿日期:2019-11-25 出版日期:2020-09-28 发布日期:2020-09-30
  • 通讯作者: 徐淑芳(通讯作者),华南理工大学经济与贸易学院教授,博士
  • 作者简介:王艳,广东外语外贸大学会计学院教授,博士;何竺虔,广东财经大学会计学院硕士研究生。
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金一般项目（16BGL058）。

Which Is the Smartest?——Evidence from China's M&A Market

Wang Yan1, Xu Shufang2, He Zhuqian3   

  1. 1. School of Accounting, Guangdong University of Foreign Studies, Guangzhou 510006;
    2. School of Economics and Trade, South China University of Technology, Guangzhou 510006;
    3. School of Accounting, Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, Guangzhou 510320
  • Received:2019-11-25 Online:2020-09-28 Published:2020-09-30

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摘要： 本文以2008-2011年间我国A股上市公司发生的重大资产重组类并购事件为研究对象，以2008-2015年为研究期间，考察了股东财富效应和公司治理及地区市场化进程对并购后1~4年主并公司绩效的影响。研究发现，公司治理会促进并购市场绩效与财务绩效，且对财务绩效的影响表现为先弱后强的特征，地区市场化进程和股东财富效应对并购市场绩效有提升作用，但股东财富效应表现为先强后弱的影响特征。研究还表明，股东会治理与董事长总经理分离可以促进公司治理发挥作用，同时提升并购市场绩效与财务绩效，在适当的董事会规模内增加董事人数、提高独立董事占比及女性高管占比，可以使公司治理对并购财务绩效发挥积极作用，在地区市场化治理中，市场中介组织和法律制度环境是促进主并公司通过外部环境治理并提升并购市场绩效的最主要因素。在重大资产重组制度背景下，本文揭示了公司治理正式制度及企业所在地区的市场化制度环境可以促进并购创造企业价值的可行性和重要性。

关键词: 并购绩效, 股东财富, 公司治理, 市场化进程

Abstract: Based on the events of material asset restructuring typical of acquirers listed in China stock market from 2008 to 2011, this paper investigates shareholder wealth effect, corporate governance and market liberalization on the acquisition performance over the four-year post-acquisition period. The findings are as follows. Firstly, corporate governance enhances acquisition market-based performance and accounting-based performance together, and the impact on accounting-based performance is characterized by the sequence of the weak first and strong later. Secondly, shareholder wealth effect and market liberalization improve acquisition market-based performance, and the impact from shareholder wealth effect is strong first and then weak. Further analysis reaches more conclusions. Firstly, corporate governance of shareholders' annual general meeting and separating the chairman and CEO roles increase acquisition market-based performance and accounting-based performance together. Secondly, increasing the number of directors and percentage of independent directors and female managers in a board of appropriate size has a positive influence on acquisition accounting-based performance. Thirdly, in the process of marketization, marketing intermediary and legal system are positively related with acquisition market-based performance. In this paper, we reveal that under the background of material asset reorganization, the formal system of corporate governance and the system environment of market liberalization are helpful for acquirers to improve their acquisition performance.

Key words: acquisition performance, shareholder wealth effect, corporate governance, market liberalization