客户关系型交易、高管薪酬业绩敏感性与非效率投资

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文用2009—2015年的沪深A股上市企业为样本，验证了客户关系型交易对供应商企业高管薪酬业绩敏感性和投资行为的影响。研究表明：企业客户关系型交易占比较高会显著减弱高管薪酬业绩敏感性，且这种效应会显著降低企业的投资效率。进一步研究表明：客户关系型交易对高管薪酬业绩敏感性的负作用在国有企业和非国有企业中均存在，但在非国有企业中的降低效应更大；客户关系型交易对高管薪酬业绩敏感性的负效应会显著降低国有企业和非国有企业的投资效率，在国有企业中主要为投资过度，在非国有企业中主要为投资不足。客户关系型交易对高管薪酬业绩敏感性的负效应在环境不确定性高低两组中均显著，但在环境不确定性低组该效应较高；客户关系型交易导致高管薪酬业绩敏感性的降低在环境不确定性较高的组别中会显著增加企业的投资不足，而在环境不确定性较低的组别中，此负向作用得到抑制。

关键词: 客户关系型交易, 高管薪酬业绩敏感性, 非效率投资, 产权性质, 环境不确定性

Abstract: This paper uses the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2015 as a sample to verify the impact of customer relationship transactions on executive pay-performance sensitivity and investment efficiency. The results of the study show that the relationship-based transactions of customers will significantly reduce the executive pay-performance sensitivity, and this effect will significantly increase the company's inefficient investment, which not only promotes excessive investment but also exacerbates insufficient investment. Further inspections distinguishing the nature of property rights and differences in the external environment find that the increase in customer relationship transactions significantly reduces executive pay-performance sensitivity in both state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises, but the reduction effect on non-state-owned enterprises is significantly greater than that on state-owned enterprises; customers relational transactions reducing executive pay-performance sensitivity will significantly increase such inefficient investment, as over-investment by state-owned companies and under-investment by non-state-owned companies. The effect of customer relationship transactions significantly reducing executive pay-performance sensitivity exists in both the higher and lower environmental uncertainty groups, but the effect is larger in the lower environmental uncertainty groups; The reduced executive pay-performance sensitivity will significantly increase the under-investment of companies with higher environmental uncertainty. However, for companies with lower environmental uncertainty, this negative effect is suppressed.

Key words: customer relationship transaction, executive pay-performance sensitivity, inefficient investment, the nature of ownership, environmental uncertainty

曹越, 胡新玉, 陈文瑞, 鲁昱. 客户关系型交易、高管薪酬业绩敏感性与非效率投资[J]. 管理评论, 2020, 32(8): 166-178.

Cao Yue, Hu Xinyu, Chen Wenrui, Lu Yu. Customer Relationship Transaction, Executive Pay-performance Sensitivity and Inefficient Investment[J]. Management Review, 2020, 32(8): 166-178.

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