管理评论

›› 2020, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (5): 205-216.

• 市场营销 • 上一篇    下一篇

不同价格领导权下的产品定价及差异化策略研究

金亮1, 黄向敏2   

  1. 1. 南昌大学经济管理学院, 南昌 330031;
    2. 南昌大学中国中部经济社会发展研究中心, 南昌 330031
  • 收稿日期:2017-08-14 出版日期:2020-05-28 发布日期:2020-06-03
  • 作者简介:金亮,南昌大学经济管理学院讲师,博士;黄向敏,南昌大学中国中部经济社会发展研究中心助理研究员,硕士。
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金项目(71902079)；教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目（19YJC630067；19YJC630229）；江西省社会科学规划项目（19GL39）。

Optimal Pricing and Product Differentiation Strategy under Different Price Leadership

Jin Liang1, Huang Xiangmin2   

  1. 1. School of Economics and Management, Nanchang University, Nanchang 330031;
    2. Central China Economic and Social Development Center, Nanchang University, Nanchang 330031
  • Received:2017-08-14 Online:2020-05-28 Published:2020-06-03

PDF (PC)

468

摘要：

针对由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的供应链，考虑制造商生产的两种质量差异化产品通过零售商销往同一市场，在制造商价格领导权结构、零售商价格领导权结构以及供应双方均势结构等三种情形下，分别构建了制造商产品差异化策略实施前后的供应链博弈模型。通过模型求解，得到三种情形下的子博弈精炼纳什均衡，进而分析了制造商实施产品差异化策略的可行条件，考察了不同价格领导权结构对供应链均衡和消费者剩余的影响。研究结果表明，制造商实施产品差异化策略存在可行条件；在不同价格领导权结构下，高质量产品的批发价格和零售价格总是更高；拥有价格领导权的供应链成员总是能够获得更多利润，但不平衡的价格领导权结构也会加剧供应链双重边际效应，导致供应链系统利润和消费者剩余的损失。

关键词: 不同价格领导权, 产品差异化, 定价, 消费者剩余

Abstract:

This paper discusses a supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a retailer, where the retailer is supplied by the manufacturer with products of differentiated quality, namely high-quality products and low quality products. According to the price leadership differences, and considering the product differentiation, there types of models are constructed in this paper, which are two Stackelberg game models dominated by the manufacturer and retailer respectively and the Nash game model. By the solutions, we derive, for each supply chain participant, the optimal profit of system, and the equilibrium pricing, demands, profits, consumer surplus under each power structure. We find that the differentiation strategy of product will increase the profit of manufacturer, and supply chain participants’ price leadership leads to higher profit. The imbalanced price leadership between the manufacturer and the retailer hurts the profits of the system and consumer surplus. On the basis, we use a number of examples to compare the supply chain participants’ profit and the supply chain’s total profits under different power structures.

Key words: different price leadership, product differentiation, pricing, consumer surplus