信息反馈对排污权组合拍卖影响的实验研究

›› 2019, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (10): 50-59.

信息反馈对排污权组合拍卖影响的实验研究

郑君君, 张兵, 马刚, 李诚志

武汉大学经济与管理学院, 武汉 430072

收稿日期:2018-12-19 出版日期:2019-10-28 发布日期:2019-11-05
作者简介:郑君君,武汉大学经济与管理学院教授,博士生导师,博士;张兵,武汉大学经济与管理学院博士研究生;马刚,武汉大学经济与管理学院博士研究生;李诚志,武汉大学经济与管理学院博士研究生。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金面上项目（71771181）。

An Experimental Study of the Impact of Information Feedback on Combinatorial Auction of Emission Permits

Zheng Junjun, Zhang Bing, Ma Gang, Li Chengzhi

Economics and Management School, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072

Received:2018-12-19 Online:2019-10-28 Published:2019-11-05

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

本文运用实验经济学方法研究了不同类型信息反馈对排污权组合拍卖结果的影响，并从分配效率、投标企业总收益和政府收益这三个维度对结果进行了分析。研究结果表明，需求信息的反馈有助于提高拍卖效率，且拍卖效率提高所带来的总的社会剩余的增加部分被更多地分配给了投标企业。然而，分配结果信息的反馈并不能带来拍卖效率的提高，我们认为这是由于分配结果信息并不属于任务信息，对分配结果信息的反馈无法帮助个体更加深刻地理解决策环境，从而无法优化其投标策略。

关键词: 组合拍卖, 信息反馈, 投标行为, 实验

Abstract:

This paper uses methods of experimental economics to study the impact of different types of information feedback on combinatorial auction results of emission permits, and we analyze the results from three dimensions:distribution efficiency, total revenue of the bidders and the government revenue. The results show that feedback of demand information can increase the auction efficiency, and more of the overall social surplus resulting from the increase in auction efficiency is allocated to the bidders. However, feedback of distribution result information does not bring about an increase in auction efficiency. This is because distribution result information isn't task information, so the feedback on the distribution result information cannot help bidders better understand the decision-making environment and thus cannot optimize their bidding strategy.

Key words: combinatorial auction, information feedback, bidding behavior, experiment

郑君君, 张兵, 马刚, 李诚志. 信息反馈对排污权组合拍卖影响的实验研究[J]. , 2019, 31(10): 50-59.

Zheng Junjun, Zhang Bing, Ma Gang, Li Chengzhi. An Experimental Study of the Impact of Information Feedback on Combinatorial Auction of Emission Permits[J]. , 2019, 31(10): 50-59.

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