管理评论

›› 2019, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (10): 191-199.

• 组织行为与人力资源管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于演化博弈分析的政府规制对企业劳务派遣用工行为影响研究

李广平   

  1. 河南工业大学管理学院, 郑州 450001
  • 收稿日期:2018-12-08 出版日期:2019-10-28 发布日期:2019-11-05
  • 作者简介:李广平,河南工业大学管理学院副教授,博士。
  • 基金资助:

    河南省研究生质量工程项目（hnyjs2017pp04；hnyjs2018kc16）；河南工业大学高层次人才基金项目（2018SB2007）。

Study of Government Regulation and Corporate Labor Dispatch Behavior on the Basis of Evolutionary Game Theory

Li Guangping   

  1. School of Management, Henan University of Technology, Zhengzhou 450001
  • Received:2018-12-08 Online:2019-10-28 Published:2019-11-05

PDF (PC)

680

摘要：

本文针对我国企业劳务派遣用工的行为，基于演化博弈论的方法，通过所构建的政府与企业之间的演化博弈模型，并结合中国银行的案例，分析了政府规制与企业劳务派遣用工行为之间的演化规律。研究发现：政府与企业围绕劳务派遣用工问题之间的博弈不存在演化稳定策略（ESS），而是一个动态演化的过程。在此过程中，政府的规制行为主要取决于规制成本、规制收益以及该采取却未采取规制措施所产生的社会负面影响，而企业的劳务派遣用工行为则受到政府规制、来自社会公众的监督以及劳动者自身对雇主形象及品牌的关注和重视等因素影响。最后，围绕如何构建更为公平、有效的劳务派遣用工市场，规范企业劳务派遣用工，提出了可供政府及企业借鉴和参考的建议。

关键词: 政府规制, 劳务派遣, 演化博弈

Abstract:

In view of the enterprise labor dispatch behavior and through the evolutionary game model about government and enterprises, this paper analyzes the evolution pattern of government regulation and corporate labor dispatch behavior on the basis of evolutionary game theory. As shown in the study, there is no evolution stable strategy (ESS) in the evolutionary game of the government and enterprises labor dispatching, and instead, it is a dynamic process of evolution. In this process, the government regulation mainly depends on regulation costs, returns and the negative effect caused by the omission of the relevant regulations, while the enterprises labor dispatching is affected by government regulation, supervision of the public and the labors' attention for their employer and brand, etc. Finally we provide some specific suggestions for building a more equitable, efficient labor dispatching market.

Key words: government regulation, labor dispatch, evolutionary game theory