关键词: 零售商主导, TPL, 生鲜农产品, 供应链, 契约效率

Abstract:

TPL's participation is of realistic significance for improving the circulation efficiency of fresh agri-products supply chain, but it also increases the complexity of the supply chain contract design. Assuming that the market demand of fresh agri-products depends on the price and the logistics service level, we build a sequential non-cooperative game model in which a retailer is the leader while a TPL service provider and a supplier are both followers. The wholesale price contract and logistics service cost-sharing contract can coordinate the logistics service levels and reduce the retail price efficiently. However, there tail price is still higher than the corresponding result in centralized situation. In order to improve the efficiency of the system, we introduce the revenue-sharing, quantity discount and linear transfer payment contract respectively into the system. The evaluation of the contract efficiency indicates that retailer's domination and TPL's participation will cause the contracts' impact on supply chain operation to be contrary to the general case. Furthermore, these three contracts are complementary to each other, i.e., the revenue-sharing contract causes the retrogression of cooperation and quantity discount contract maintains the status quo, while the linear transfer payment contract can improve the operation efficiency. Then, based on the original contract combination, we introduce a transport-market clearance contract into the system and achieve the system coordination. Finally, the sensitivity analyses on contracts' parameters are made to verify the conclusions and then management implications are obtained.

Key words: retailer-led, third-party logistics, fresh agri-products, supply chain, contract efficiency