决策者心理因素对企业知识资本投资行为异化影响的实证研究

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

企业知识资本投资与企业机器设备等固定资产投资相比，具有投入产出关系不明显、投资回收期长、投资风险大等特点，更容易产生投资不足或过度投资等投资行为异化现象。本文以行为经济学理论和心理学理论为基础，分析了决策者心理因素对企业知识资本投资行为异化的影响，并以高管团队特征为替代变量，建立了企业知识资本投资行为异化的影响关系模型，采用我国计算机、通讯和其他电子设备制造业上市公司数据，进行了实证分析。实证结果发现：团队薪酬差距越大、高管兼职比例越大、团队规模越大，企业知识资本投资就越趋向于投资不足；高管团队持股异质性越大，企业知识资本投资就越趋向于过度投资。实证结果表明：高管团队成员的社会认同感、分配公平感和社会背景效应等决策者心理因素对企业知识资本投资行为异化有显著的影响作用。

关键词: 知识资本投资, 行为异化, 决策者心理, 高管团队

Abstract:

Compared with fixed assets investment such as machinery equipment, enterprise intellectual capital investment has the characteristics of non-obvious input-output relation, long payback period and high investment risk, and thus is likely to lead to the phenomena of alienation in intellectual capital investment such as underinvestment or overinvestment. Based on behavioral economics and psychology theory, this paper analyzes the effect of decision makers' psychological factors on the phenomena of alienation in intellectual capital investment and builds a model of the relationship between the top management team's characteristics and the behavior alienation in intellectual capital investment using top management team's characteristics as proxy variable. Then, taking Chinese listed companies in computer, communication and other electronic equipment manufacturing industry as samples, an empirical analysis is carried out. From the empirical results, we find:First,under the top management team characteristics of greater salary heterogeneity, or more part-time proportion, or bigger team size, a company is more inclined to under-invest in intellectual capital investment; Second, under the top management team characteristics of more shareholding heterogeneity, a company is more inclined to over-invest. The empirical results show that the decision-makers' psychological factors such as social identity, distributive justice perceptions, and social background effect of top management team member,have a significant impact on the behavior of alienation in intellectual capital investment.

Key words: intellectual capital investment, alienation of behavior, decision-makers' psychological factors, top management team

张瀛之, 刘志远, 张炳发. 决策者心理因素对企业知识资本投资行为异化影响的实证研究[J]. , 2017, 29(9): 205-214.

Zhang Yingzhi, Liu Zhiyuan, Zhang Bingfa. Empirical Research on the Effect of Decision-makers' Psychological Factors on the Behavior Alienation in Company Intellectual Capital Investment[J]. , 2017, 29(9): 205-214.

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