管理评论

›› 2017, Vol. 29 ›› Issue (5): 131-142.

• 组织与战略管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

项目组织中发包人风险分担对承包人行为的影响——承包人信任与被信任感的并行中介作用

王雪青1, 许树生1, 徐志超2   

  1. 1. 天津大学管理与经济学部, 天津 300072;
    2. 天津轨道交通集团有限公司, 天津 300392
  • 收稿日期:2017-01-23 出版日期:2017-05-28 发布日期:2017-05-26
  • 作者简介:王雪青,天津大学管理与经济学部教授,博士生导师,博士;许树生,天津大学管理与经济学部博士研究生;徐志超,天津轨道交通集团有限公司投资管理部职员,博士。
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金重点项目（71231006）；国家自然科学基金项目（71172148）；中国太平洋财产保险股份有限公司天津分公司委托项目。

Employer's Risk Allocation and Contractor's Behavior in Project Organization: Parallel Mediating Effect of Contractor's Feeling Trusted and Contractor's Trust

Wang Xueqing1, Xu Shusheng1, Xu Zhichao2   

  1. 1. Department of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072;
    2. Tianjin Rail Transit, Tianjin 300392
  • Received:2017-01-23 Online:2017-05-28 Published:2017-05-26

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摘要：

项目绩效的持续改善不仅要求承包人完成角色内行为，而且需要激发其角色外行为。然而，现实中发包人以风险分担为依托的激励方式侧重于经济激励，偏废承包人的社会人属性需求，阻碍了风险分担激励作用的发挥。本研究基于自我实现预言理论及社会交换理论，引入承包人被信任感与承包人信任两个概念，以期打开发包人风险分担对承包人激励作用路径的黑箱。来自149名承包人的实证结果表明：发包人风险分担正向影响承包人角色内行为与角色外行为；承包人被信任感在发包人风险分担与承包人行为关系间起到了部分中介作用；发包人风险分担与承包人信任弱相关，但承包人信任有助于促进承包人角色内行为与角色外行为的产生。理论上，本研究进一步深化了对项目组织中承包人激励的认知；实践上，为增强对承包人的激励水平提供了理论指导与管理启示。

关键词: 项目组织, 发包人风险分担, 承包人行为, 承包人被信任感, 承包人信任

Abstract:

Persistent improvement of project performance not only requires the contractor to complete the in-role behavior, but also requires the employer to stimulate the contractor's extra-role behavior. However, in reality, the incentives based on risk allocation focus on economic incentives, but neglect the needs of contractors as social beings, which hinder the incentive role of risk allocation. Based on self-fulfilling prophecy theory and social exchange theory, the study introduces the contractor's feeling trusted and the contractor's trust, in order to explore the mechanism of how the employer's risk allocation motivates the contractor. Empirical test results based on an analysis of 149 valid questionnaires show that:First, there is a positive correlation between the employer's risk allocation and the contractor's in-role and extra-role behavior. Second, the contractor's feeling trusted plays a partial mediating role between employer's risk allocation and contractor's behavior. Third, the employer's risk allocation is weakly related to contractor's trust, but contributes to generate contractor's in-role and extra-role behavior. In theory, this study further deepens the understanding of incentive for contractor in the project organization. In practice, the findings provide theoretical guidance and management implication for improving the effectiveness of incentives on the contractor.

Key words: project organization, employer's risk allocation, contractor's behavior, contractor's feeling trusted, contractor's trust