管理评论

›› 2016, Vol. 28 ›› Issue (11): 16-29.

• 经济与金融管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

TRIPS-plus条款下平行进口与价格补贴政策协调的模拟仿真分析

周华, 曲洋, 赵轩   

  1. 同济大学经济与管理学院, 上海 200092
  • 收稿日期:2014-09-02 出版日期:2016-11-28 发布日期:2016-11-23
  • 作者简介:周华,同济大学经济与管理学院副教授,硕士生导师,博士;曲洋,同济大学经济与管理学院硕士研究生;赵轩,同济大学经济与管理学院硕士研究生。
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金面上项目（71373176）。

Simulation Analysis on Coordination Parallel Import and Price Subsidy Policy under TRIPS-plus Treaty

Zhou Hua, Qu Yang, Zhao Xuan   

  1. Tongji University College of Economics and Management, Shanghai 200092
  • Received:2014-09-02 Online:2016-11-28 Published:2016-11-23

PDF (PC)

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摘要：

近年来，一些发达国家通过TRIPS-plus条款要求与其签订自由贸易协议的发展中国家禁止平行进口，以加强知识产权保护。为使发展中国家有效应对TRIPS-plus条款，本文克服平行进口数据难以获取的缺陷，首次通过Swarm软件平台，运用ProbeIPD程序模拟仿真发达国家和发展中国家有关平行进口和价格补贴政策的动态博弈过程。文章首先对1个发达国家与1个发展中国家之间的动态博弈过程进行模拟仿真，然后将参与主体扩展为N个发达国家与N个发展中国家，从而得到动态博弈均衡解；最后考虑不确定因素对均衡解的影响。研究发现，在1个发达国家与1个发展中国家的动态博弈中，发展中国家可以通过价格补贴在一定程度上打破发达国家的限制，在国际贸易中更好保护己方利益；在N个发达国家与N个发展中国家的动态博弈中，发展中国家群体与发达国家群体经济发展水平差距越小，则发展中国家通过提供价格补贴来争取平行进口权的作用相对越强。

关键词: TRIPS-plus条款, 平行进口, 价格补贴, 模拟仿真

Abstract:

In order to strengthen the protection of their intellectual property rights, some developed countries prohibited their developing country trading-partners from using parallel imports through the TRIPS-plus clause. In order to help the developing countries to effectively deal with the terms of the TRIPS-plus, this paper for the first time applies ProbeIPD on Swarm platform to simulate the dynamic games between the developed countries and the developing countries, overcoming the difficulties of obtaining parallel import data. We firstly simulate the dynamic process of the game between 1 developed country and 1 developing country, and then extend it to N developed countries and N developing countries, both resulting in dynamic game equilibrium. Finally, we consider the impact of uncertainty on the equilibrium solution. According to the research, the results could be divided into two occasions. When in the dynamic game model of only two countries (one is developing country and the other is developed one), in some extent, the developing countries could use price sub-sidies to break through the trading restrictions from the developed countries so as to protect their own interests. Moreover, when in the dy-namic model of multi-countries (N developing countries and N developed ones), the economic gap between the developing group and the developed group is negatively related to the bargaining power of the developing groups that use price subsidy strategy, i.e., the less the gap is, the more powerful the developing countries are in bargaining for parallel imports rights by using price subsidy strategy.

Key words: TRIPS-plus treaty, parallel import, price subsidy, simulationS