2016年度诺贝尔经济科学奖获得者Oliver Hart与Bengt Holmström研究工作评述

›› 2016, Vol. 28 ›› Issue (10): 3-10.

• 经济与金融管理 • 下一篇

2016年度诺贝尔经济科学奖获得者Oliver Hart与Bengt Holmström研究工作评述

闫妍^1,2, 刘宜¹

1. 中国科学院大学经济与管理学院, 北京 100080;
2. 中国科学院大数据挖掘与知识管理重点实验室, 北京 100080

收稿日期:2016-10-14 出版日期:2016-10-28 发布日期:2016-10-31
作者简介:闫妍,中国科学院大学经济与管理学院副教授,博士;中国科学院大数据挖掘与知识管理重点实验室副研究员;刘宜,中国科学院大学经济与管理学院硕士研究生。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金项目（71573243）；中科院青年创新促进会基金（2015359）；中国科学院大数据挖掘与知识管理重点实验室开放课题。

Comments on the Work of Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström——Nobel Prize Winners in Economic Sciences in 2016

Yan Yan^1,2, Liu Yi¹

1. School of Economics and Management, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100080;
2. Key Laboratory of Big Data Mining and Knowledge Management, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100080

Received:2016-10-14 Online:2016-10-28 Published:2016-10-31

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

经济学家Oliver Hart和Bengt Holmström因其对契约理论做出的贡献，被授予2016年度诺贝尔经济科学奖。Oliver Hart的贡献主要在不完全契约理论，Bengt Holmström的贡献则主要在完全契约理论。契约理论有助于解决由信息不对称引发的经济效益降低的问题，保障社会分工基础上的合作能够有序推进。本文就二位教授在契约理论领域所取得的主要学术成就进行梳理，简要介绍了契约理论对经济社会发展的贡献。

关键词: 诺贝尔经济科学奖, 契约理论, 完全契约理论, 不完全契约理论

Abstract:

The Sverige Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2016 was awarded jointly to economists Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström for their contributions to contract theory. We review Hart's contributions to incomplete contracts and Holmström's contributions to complete contracts. Building up the optimal incentive contracts and choosing the suitable allocation of property rights can help safeguard the social division of labor cooperation and thus promote the development of economy. This paper summarizes the academic contributions of Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström in contract theory, and introduces the contributions of contract theory for the development of our society.

Key words: the Sverige Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, contract theory, complete contract theory, incomplete contract theory

闫妍, 刘宜. 2016年度诺贝尔经济科学奖获得者Oliver Hart与Bengt Holmström研究工作评述[J]. , 2016, 28(10): 3-10.

Yan Yan, Liu Yi. Comments on the Work of Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström——Nobel Prize Winners in Economic Sciences in 2016[J]. , 2016, 28(10): 3-10.

参考文献

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2016年度诺贝尔经济科学奖获得者Oliver Hart与Bengt Holmström研究工作评述

Comments on the Work of Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström——Nobel Prize Winners in Economic Sciences in 2016

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