管理评论

›› 2016, Vol. 28 ›› Issue (10): 239-249.

• 物流与供应链管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

双寡头零售商分销渠道产品质量控制策略研究

朱立龙1,2   

  1. 1. 山东师范大学商学院, 济南 250014;
    2. 山东大学管理学院, 济南 250100
  • 收稿日期:2014-08-04 出版日期:2016-10-28 发布日期:2016-10-31
  • 作者简介:朱立龙,山东大学管理学院博士后,山东师范大学商学院副教授,硕士生导师,博士。
  • 基金资助:

    国家社会科学基金重点项目（13AGL012）；中国博士后科学基金面上项目（2015M580597）；山东省博士后创新项目（201503009）；山东师范大学青年科技项目培育基金。

Products Quality Control Strategy of Distribution Channel with Duopoly Retailers

Zhu Lilong1,2   

  1. 1. School of Business, Shandong Normal University, Ji'nan 250014;
    2. School of Management, Shandong University, Ji'nan 250100
  • Received:2014-08-04 Online:2016-10-28 Published:2016-10-31

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摘要：

基于四阶段Stackelberg动态博弈分析，构建了双寡头零售商分销渠道产品质量控制策略模型，分析了传统零售渠道和混合渠道结构中不同参数变量对制定产品质量控制策略的影响，并探讨了供应商分散式决策和集中式决策下不同渠道结构中如何制定产品质量控制策略的问题。通过模型分析，可以证明：供应商所提供的产品质量水平随着零售商增值服务水平的上升而增加，随着顾客需求价格弹性系数的上升而下降；随着零售商增值服务水平的上升，零售价格、批发价格、顾客需求量及供应商的期望利润均增加，但零售商的期望利润将会减少；在传统零售渠道供应商集中式决策时，产品质量水平与双寡头零售商增值服务水平之和呈正比，在混合渠道供应商集中式决策时，产品质量水平高于仅存在电子直销渠道时但低于传统零售渠道时，将激发顾客的潜在需求，市场总需求最大，有效消除分销渠道中的双重边际效应。最后，通过算例分析，为该模型在实践中的具体应用指明了方向。

关键词: 双寡头零售商, 分销渠道, Stackelberg动态博弈, 分散式决策, 集中式决策

Abstract:

Based on four-stage Stackelberg dynamic game analysis, this paper constructs products quality control model of distribution channel with duopoly retailers, analyzes different parameter variables' effect on the making of product quality control strategy in traditional retail channel and mixed channel, and studies how to make product quality control strategy when the supplier adopts decentralized decision and centralized decision. Through the model analysis, we demonstrate that supplier's product quality level will increase with the increasing of retailers' adding value service level, and it will decrease with the increasing of customer's demand price elasticity; the retail price, wholesale price, customer demands and supplier's expected profits will increase and retailers' expected profits will decrease with the increasing of added value service level; when supplier makes centralized decision in traditional retail channel, the products quality level is in proportion to the sum of duopoly retailers' added value service level, when supplier makes centralized decision in mixed channel, the products quality level will be higher than when only electronic direct channel exists and lower than when traditional retail channel exists, and then it will arouse customer's potential demands, the market demands will be the maximum and thus eliminate the double marginalization effect. Finally, we conduct a numerical example which indicates a direction in practice for further specific application.

Key words: duopoly retailers, distribution channel, Stackelberg dynamic game, decentralized decision, centralized decision