›› 2015, Vol. 27 ›› Issue (11): 170-180.

• 组织行为与人力资源管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

领域知识专用性投资对接收方机会主义行为的影响与治理

周俊1,2, 袁建新1   

  1. 1. 苏州大学东吴商学院, 苏州 215021;
    2. 南京大学商学院, 南京 210093
  • 收稿日期:2013-10-24 出版日期:2015-11-30 发布日期:2015-12-07
  • 作者简介:周俊,苏州大学东吴商学院副教授,南京大学商学院在站博士后;袁建新,苏州大学东吴商学院教授,博士。
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金项目(71102116);国家自然科学基金面上项目(71572121);中国博士后基金面上项目(2013-M540440)。

The Impact of Domain Knowledge Specific Investments on Receivers' Opportunism and Governance Mechanisms

Zhou Jun1,2, Yuan Jianxin1   

  1. 1. Dongwu Business School, Soochow University, Suzhou 215021;
    2. Business School, Nanjing University, Nanjing 210093
  • Received:2013-10-24 Online:2015-11-30 Published:2015-12-07

摘要:

以163对软件外包关系为样本,利用多元层级线性回归法进行假设检验,旨在探讨领域知识专用性投资对接收方机会主义行为可能存在的独特影响,同时分析关系治理和合同治理的调节作用及相互关系。研究结果表明:(1)软件外包企业的领域知识专用性投资显著抑制了客户(专用性投资的接收方)的机会主义行为;(2)关系型规范和合同完备性不仅显著正向调节了领域知识专用性投资和客户机会主义之间的负相关关系,还直接抑制了客户机会主义行为;(3)合同完备性和关系型规范呈现某种程度的互补性;(4)与关系型规范相比,合同完备性的治理作用更为突出。以上结论揭示了领域知识专用性投资对接收方机会主义的独特影响,并深化了对合同完备性和关系型规范的治理作用的认识。

关键词: 领域知识专用性投资, 机会主义, 合同完备性, 关系型规范

Abstract:

Using the sample data from 163 software outsourcing relationships, this research explores the possibly unique impact of domain knowledge specific investments(DKSIs) on the receiving firms' opportunism and the moderating effects of relational and contractual governance mechanisms by means of hierarchical linear regression. The results are as follows. Firstly, DKSIs by the software providers significantly suppress their clients' opportunism. Secondly, relational norms and contractual completeness not only positively moderate the negative relationship between DKSIs and clients' opportunism, but also have direct suppressing effects. Thirdly, contractual completeness and relational norms are complementary to each other to some extent. Lastly, contractual completeness shows stronger impact than relational norms. This study reveals the particular effect of DKSIs on the receivers' opportunism and deepens our understanding of the governing impacts of contractual completeness and relational norms.

Key words: domain knowledge-specific investments, opportunism, contractual completeness, relational norms