Research on the Relational Contract of IT Product R&D Project Outsourcing Based on the Theory of Dualistic Value Structure

Abstract

Abstract:

Based on the theory of product dualistic value structure, we discuss the relational contract on the long-term cooperation relation of the IT product R&D project outsourcing between the contract-awarding party and the contractor who aim at the basic value function goals and the transcend value function goals, using the principal-agent theory and multi stage game method, and finish a simulation analysis. We find that if the contract-awarding party defaults, then the relational contract about transcend value function goals will not be able to continue. The possibility of breaking relational contract will be increased with the discount rate. When the contract-awarding party obtains enough benefits from the transcend value function goals, then the possibility of default will be small. The total revenue of enterprise from dualistic value goals has a positive correlation with objective weight. The contract-awarding party should weigh the two kinds of value, and regulate the incentive intensity as needed. If the contract-awarding party defaults in the first stage, then in the later stages, it can only increase total revenue by incentive intensity of the basic value goals. The study not only enriches the theory of principal-agent theory, but also has some implications for the practice of IT product R & D outsourcing.

Key words: dualistic value, R&D outsourcing, multi stage, relational contract

Chu Yanfeng, Gong Bin, Zhang Zhuo. Research on the Relational Contract of IT Product R&D Project Outsourcing Based on the Theory of Dualistic Value Structure[J]. , 2017, 29(12): 39-49.

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