Identification of High-tech Enterprises, Political Connections and Private Enterprises' Technology Innovation

Abstract

Abstract:

Using the data of A-share listed private high-tech companies during 2005 to 2014, this paper investigates the incentive effect of identification of high-tech enterprises on private enterprises' technology innovation and the moderating effect of political connections on this incentive effect. Test results show that, identification of high-tech enterprises significantly motivates private enterprises' technology innovation, but this effect only exists in non-family enterprises, high-tech enterprises newly-recognized after 2008 and enterprises with no tax incentives before identification. Further tests find that political connections significantly and positively moderate the incentive effect of identification of high-tech enterprises on private enterprises' technology innovation, but this effect only exists in regions with more government intervention, lower level of financial development and lower level of intellectual property protection. The results of this paper indicate that there is still private enterprises' rent-seeking for political connections with the continuous improvement of formal system at the same time, and political connections still play an important role in private enterprises' resource acquisition.

Key words: identification of high-tech enterprises, political connections, private enterprises' technology innovation

Xu Lingling. Identification of High-tech Enterprises, Political Connections and Private Enterprises' Technology Innovation[J]. , 2017, 29(9): 84-94.

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