The Double-edged Sword of Cross-cutting Identity of Senior Executives and Its Effect on the Growth of Non-SOEs

Abstract

Abstract:

In this paper, we make an empirical study of the relationship between the cross-cutting identity of senior executives and the growth of non-SOEs based on the sample of listed companies in China. The results show that the scope of cross-cutting identity has significantly negative impact on the value of non-SOEs, while the levelof cross-cutting identity is positive. The cross-cutting identity of senior executives is like a double-edged sword. But after moderators being put into model, the double-side effect of the cross-cutting identity disappears. Structural uncertainty and competitive intensity play significantly positive, moderating roles between the cross-cutting identity and the growth of non-SOEs. Under the environment of structural uncertainty and competitive intensity, the cross-cutting identity of senior executives can improve the effectiveness of the R&D strategy, enhance the relationship between the R&D strategy and the growth of non-SOEs, but will damage the effectiveness of the advertising strategy and reduce the relationship between the advertising strategy and the growth of non-SOEs. The cross-cutting identity of senior executives shows its double sides again.

Key words: cross-cutting identity of senior executives, double-side effect, the growth of non-SOEs, R&D strategy, advertising strategy

Tao Houyong, Li Ling. The Double-edged Sword of Cross-cutting Identity of Senior Executives and Its Effect on the Growth of Non-SOEs[J]. , 2016, 28(10): 153-168.

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