Management Review ›› 2026, Vol. 38 ›› Issue (7): 94-105.

• Innovation and Entrepreneurship Management • Previous Articles    

Open Innovation Strategies, Value Appropriation Mechanisms and Innovation Performance: Integrating the Paradox of Openness and Protection

Zhang Huiying1, Chen Xiguang1, Li Zhendong2   

  1. 1. College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072;
    2. School of Economics and Management, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing 100876
  • Received:2023-10-20 Published:2026-07-29

Abstract: Based on contractual/non-contractual (tight/loose constrains) view, open innovation can be divided into innovation collaboration and external search. However, little is known about how these two open innovation strategies match different value appropriation mechanisms to impact innovation performance. This empirical study examines a survey of 764 manufacturing firms to explore how innovation collaboration and external search affect innovation performance, and the moderating role of patenting and secrecy. The findings show that both innovation collaboration and external search can enhance innovation performance. When firms use patenting to protect innovations, innovation collaboration significantly improves innovation performance, whereas external search is detrimental to innovation performance. On the contrary, when firms use secrecy to protect innovations, innovation collaboration is not conducive to improving innovation performance, while external search can achieve higher innovation performance. This research provides a new lens for understanding open innovation strategies, and underlines the match between open innovation strategies and value appropriation mechanisms. This paper provides important practical implications on integrating the paradox of openness of innovation process and protection of innovation output for firms involved in open innovation strategies.

Key words: innovation collaboration, external search, patenting, secrecy, innovation performance