Abstract: The government R&D subsidy contract for cross-organizational cooperation in general purpose technology involving two leading enterprises is studied, and the government R&D subsidy contract for cross-organizational cooperation in general purpose technology is designed by considering the enterprises product market strategies combination of quantity-quantity (QQ), price-price (PP), quantity-price (QP) and price-quantity (PQ), as well as the complementary and substitution of products. The government R&D subsidy contract for cross-organization cooperation of general purpose technology is designed to analyze under which situation a cross-organization cooperation R&D subsidy contract for general purpose technology between the government and the leading enterprises can better stimulate their R&D efforts and what key factors influence subsidy contracts. The results show that the combination of QP and PQ strategies is not preferred in subsidy contracts. When the two enterprises produce complementary products, the PP strategy combination is preferred in subsidy contracts. When one enterprise produces products that can substitute the other enterprise’s products, both enterprises operate in a small market, their products are highly substitutable and their unit sales costs are very different, the PP strategy combination is preferred in subsidy contracts, and under the opposite situation, the QQ strategy combination is preferred. The R&D effort level, government non-R&D subsidy effort, expected profit of the two enterprises and social welfare level under the preferred strategy combination are higher than those of other strategy combinations, and are affected by the coefficient of their effort’s influence on the R&D success rate and the cost coefficient of the efforts of all parties involved in the game. When the two enterprises’ products are less complementary or more substitutable with each other, and they operate in a small market, the higher the proportion of subsidies that the government should give more subsidies to the enterprise at cost disadvantage. The research conclusions provide theoretical and policy implications for promoting general purpose technology cross-organizational cooperative R&D.

Key words: general purpose technology, product market, cross-organizational cooperative R&D, government subsidy contracts