Abstract: For a supply chain composed of two heterogeneous suppliers and a third-party manufacturing platform, this paper analyzes the optimal quality information disclosure strategy of heterogeneous suppliers by constructing a dynamic game model considering that the suppliers have private quality information. Due to exploring the factors that affect the suppliers’ quality information disclosure decision, this paper discusses the influence of the supplier’s product quality and the probability of high-quality suppliers on the platform. On this basis, this paper designs an incentive contract to motivate suppliers to make quality disclosure. Then this paper discusses the changes in supply chain members’ balanced decisions before and after incentives. The results indicates that both high-quality suppliers and ordinary suppliers have the motivation to disclose or not to disclose quality information. Under certain conditions, both types of suppliers can obtain higher profits by disclosing quality information, but the supply chain does not necessarily obtain higher profits. While both types of suppliers do not disclose quality information, the platform can use transfer payment contracts to encourage high-quality suppliers to disclose quality information.

Key words: shared manufacturing, third-party platform, quality information disclosure, supply chain, incentive mechanism