Abstract: The exchange rate policy, as a centralized manifestation of macroeconomic regulation by a country’s authorities, has become the core of the rivalry in the economic and trade fields between China and the United States. The United States relies on the dominant position of the US dollar to suppress China’s rise in the global value chain. Therefore, utilizing exchange rate policy to overcome the constraints of dollar hegemony and climb the value chain has become crucial for China in building a new development pattern. Based on the incomplete exchange rate pass-through under the framework of global value chain, this paper simulates the objective facts of exchange rate policy game between China and the United States by constructing a signaling game model, analyzes the typical cases of exchange rate policy game between the two countries after the global financial crisis in 2008 and the outbreak of the epidemic in 2020, and verifies that in the face of the protectionist “coercion” game behavior pursued by the United States, China has achieved a policy shift from passive acceptance to active response, thanks to the reversal of the low-end locking of the division of labor in the value chain. But it is hard to reach a Pareto equilibrium due to the inward-looking interests of the US. In order to break this game dilemma, this paper further takes the trend of regionalization of global value chains as the focus, and argues that building a regional value chain led by China and forming a symmetric solution to the game with regional countries is a win-win choice.

Key words: global value chain, regional value chain, exchange rate policy