Abstract: In the post epidemic era, online-offline integration has become an effective method to ensure the continuity of healthcare services and improve the service quality. In this study, we develop a game-theoretical model between a Healthcare Provider (HCP) and a government under Fee-for-Service (FFS), Prospective Payment System (PPS), Bundled Payment (BP) and Pay-for-Performance (P4P). We consider the behavior of the HCP in transferring patients from offline to online at a later stage and discuss reimbursement schemes that incentivize the HCP to rationally allocate online and offline healthcare resources. The results show that FFS does not inspire the HCP to make efforts in online treatment. PPS and BP can improve online treatment efforts, but they cannot coordinate to the social optimum, and the increase of payment amount does not improve online treatment efforts. Under the Hospital Readmission Reduction Program (HRRP) based on the P4P, increasing the punishment is not always the best choice, nor can it always coordinate to the social optimum. We also find that the hybrid payment, canceling the upper limit of HRRP fine and setting reward rules, can make up for the shortcomings of HRRP and effectively coordinate to social optimum.

Key words: online-offline service allocation, effort level, reimbursement scheme, penal rules