Abstract: In the current Chinese capital market, it is common for the controlling persons of private enterprises to have foreign residency. Using Chinese private listed firms from 2008 to 2019 as samples, this paper explores the relationship between controlling person's foreign residency and corporate strategic choice. It is found that controlling person's foreign residency significantly increases the firm's strategic aggressiveness, and this finding verifies the "speculative effect" hypothesis regarding controlling person's foreign residency. This result is still valid after controlling endogeneity and carrying out a series of robustness tests. Besides, China's efforts in tracking down overseas fugitives and the bilateral extradition treaties signed between China and other countries significantly reduce the impact of foreign residency on corporate strategy. Further research results show that when the controlling person indirectly controls the firm or holds a large control right, the impact of foreign residency on corporate strategic aggressiveness is more pronounced. Also, when the shareholding ratio of management or the proportion of independent directors is relatively low, foreign residency often leads to more aggressive corporate strategies. In addition, strict audit supervision and high accounting conservatism reduce the impact of foreign residency on corporate strategic aggressiveness. This research provides references for managers, investors and regulators to understand and ease the impact of foreign residencyon firms, and provides enlightenment for relevant departments to track down fugitives and carry out extradition cooperation.

Key words: foreign residency, corporate strategy, controlling person, private enterprises