Abstract: In the era of digital economy, fair and reasonable licensing of standard essential patents is a key to maintaining market stability and enhance social welfare. Based on constructing the tripartite game model of government departments, standard essential patent licensing enterprises and standard essential patent implementing enterprises, this study analyzes the interaction mechanism and stability strategies of the three parties by using dynamic evolutionary game and carries out the simulation with the actual case as the background. The results are as follows. (1) Supervision by government departments FRAND licensing by licensing enterprises, and payment by implementing enterprises are an ideal evolutionary stability strategy; (2) The strategy choice of government departments is stable, that of licensing enterprises is of a learning nature and that of implementing enterprises is independent and fast; (3) When government supervision is absent, enterprises will seek legal support, and the success probability and income of litigation affect the strategic choice of both sides; (4) Government departments can reduce the cost of supervision and increase the intensity of punishment in order to provide the game evolution with a reliable path toward ideal state. The research results can provide reference for promoting the healthy and orderly development of related industries.

Key words: digital economy, standard essential patent, patent licensing, government departments, tripartite evolutionary game