Abstract: To explore the problem of “credit discrimination” in China, we can’t do without the specific background of Chinese capital market. Based on the fact that Chinese capital market has implemented strict market access control for a long time and the listed companies are very unevenly distributed among regions, this paper takes the companies that issued bonds from 2007 to 2017 as a sample and explores the influence of such factors as whether they are listed or not and the number of listed companies in the region on “ credit discrimination” from the perspective of credit access and bargaining power in credit extension, so as to answer who has encountered “credit discrimination”. It is found that state-owned enterprises get more bank credit, which only exists in non-listed companies, and there is no consistent evidence in listed companies; the “credit discrimination” in listed companies only exists in regions with more listed companies, and there is no significant difference in regions with less listed companies. This paper uses the bilateral stochastic boundary model to verify the bargaining power of enterprises when granted credit. It is found that the state-owned property can enhance the bargaining power of enterprises in the unlisted companies and the listed companies in the regions with a large number of listed companies. In the regions with few listed companies, the state-owned listed companies have no stronger bargaining power. The above results show that the non-state-owned enterprises do not necessarily encounter “credit discrimination” which only occurs in the circumstance where the importance of listed companies to local governments is low. It is the larger number of unlisted non-state-owned enterprises that actually encounter discrimination.

Key words: ownership, listing, distribution of listed companies, bank lines of credit, bargaining power