Abstract: The series of success on prior management earnings forecast (MEF) can induce dynamic over-optimism in management which will affect the quality of current MEF via the mechanism of optimistic expectation and/or managerial opportunism. The results based on mandatory MEFs disclosed by A-share listed companies during the period of 2003-2016 indicate that, other things being equal, the optimistic bias and error of current management earnings forecast will decrease in the series of success on prior management earnings forecast. Further analysis shows that regulatory pressure confronted by management is the key detrimental factor to the mechanism of optimistic expectation. The results are robust after controlling for static over-confidence, management forecasting ability and conservative style, and level of earnings. We provide evidence on the bright side of management's dynamic over-optimism from the perspective of information disclosure, which will help regulators and capital market participants to better understand management forecasting behavior.

Key words: dynamic over-optimism, static over-confidence, the quality of management earnings forecast, forecasting ability