Abstract: Little literature has identified the scale of corporates financing from shadow banking from the micro perspective in the past. Instead, many researches explore the governance effect of financing from the shadow banking from the macro level. This paper takes 2013-2019 A-share listed companies as research samples. We use leverage manipulation level to measure corporates' financing scale from shadow banking. The result shows that financing from shadow banking has private information that general banks cannot obtain and has a unique implementation mechanism of the financing contract. Thus, it helps to save the agency costs of financing enterprises. Under the background of "de-leveraging", financing from shadow banking objectively eases corporates' financial constraints. This short-term and high-interest financing channel also prompts enterprises to choose high-quality investment projects. In turn, it effectively restrains the inefficient investment of enterprises. Further study finds that the governance effect of financing from shadow banking is more prominent with a lower marketization degree, a lower financial constraints and a more significant level of corporate governance. This paper enriches relevant researches and provides essential references for the formulation and implementation of shadow banking policies.

Key words: corporate financing from shadow banking, debt governance effect, agency cost, inefficient investment