Management Review ›› 2021, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (10): 297-312.

• Logistics and Supply Chain Management • Previous Articles     Next Articles

Research on Supply Chain Pricing of Manufacturer Channel Invasion under New Retail Model

Li Qiuxiang1,2, Deng Qing2, Huang Yimin3   

  1. 1. Institute of Management Science and Engineering, Henan University, Kaifeng 475004;
    2. Business School, Henan University, Kaifeng 475004;
    3. School of Management and Economics, North China University of Water Resources and Hydropower, Zhengzhou 450046
  • Received:2020-09-23 Online:2021-10-28 Published:2021-11-29

Abstract: From the perspective of new retail, this paper constructs a new retail sale channel that consists of manufacturer and experience store, and studies the supply chain evolution model before and after the invasion of new retail channel. The optimal prices under decentralized decision and centralized decision models are compared, and the impact of various variables on channel pricing and participant profits before and after the channel invasion is analyzed. The results show that:(1) Under the decentralized and centralized decision models after channel invasion, with the increase of new retail channel preference rate, the new retail price increases, the traditional retail price decreases, and the online direct selling price may increase or decrease. (2) No matter whether before or after channel invasion, the profit of supply chain under centralized decision is always higher than that under decentralized decision. (3) The increase of new retail channel preference rate will increase manufacturer's profit and decrease retailer's profit, so new retail channel preference rate will enhance manufacturer's channel invasion motivation. Finally, a numerical analysis shows that under certain conditions, channel intrusion can increase the profit of manufacturer and retailer, and then realize Pareto improvement, which is beneficial to the supply chain system.

Key words: new retail, channel invasion, pricing, channel preference, Pareto improvement